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I. INTRODUCTION 
The law and policy governing tax shelters is incomplete, 
sometimes contradictory, and occasionally incoherent.  Indeed, 
consensus has yet to emerge even as to which transactions 
should bear the tax shelter label.1  Often reform efforts are 
grounded in theories that are largely external to tax law—for 
example, economic theory relating to incentives.2  Fewer 
approaches rely on intrinsic tax policies, including that most 
fundamental of income tax principles—the Schanz-Haig-Simons3 
income concept ("H-S").4  Under H-S, an income tax base should 
                                                          
 1.  See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term "tax 
shelter." 
 2. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 
215, 239, 246, 251-53 (2001) (suggesting the use of tax shelters may be reduced if the 
method of attacking tax shelters were more specifically geared towards affecting 
taxpayers' economic incentives); see also Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic 
Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389, 395-98 (2010) (arguing the tax shelter label should not 
be applied to transactions to which Congress intentionally attached economic incentives). 
 3. The formulation is named after three individuals who all advocated similar 
income concepts: Georg Schanz, Robert Haig, and Henry Simons.  See HENRY C. SIMONS, 
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL 
POLICY 60-62 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1962) (1938) (describing the relationship of Schanz 
and Haig to Simons' proposed definition); Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income — 
Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 20 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 
1921) (briefly discussing Schanz); see also JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 37-38 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter DODGE ET. AL., 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX] (describing contributions of Schanz, Haig, and Simons); Stanley A. 
Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under An Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV. 679, 684 
n.18 (1988) (briefly discussing Schanz). 
 The title of this Article could thus more properly be "What would Georg Schanz, 
Robert Haig, and Henry Simons do?," but that seemed too cumbersome. 
 4. Of course, H-S had its origins in economic approaches to income definition, but 
as H-S has come to be generally interpreted and used in formulating tax policy, it is 
readily characterized as being an endogenous tax concept.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 Professor Leandra Lederman has discussed how the technique of basketing could be 
used to combat corporate tax shelters while noting that basketing departs from the H-S 
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be expansive, requiring inclusion of an individual's increases in 
wealth and allowing reductions only for non-personal costs that 
reduce wealth.5  This Article seeks to open a line of inquiry into 
the possible benefits of incorporating H-S into the tax shelter 
discussion.  Specifically, this Article discusses the potential 
results of injecting H-S into the debate over the Economic 
Substance Doctrine ("ESD")—a debate that seems unlikely to 
diminish in spite of the recent codification of the ESD.6 
The ESD has generally been applied when a taxpayer's route 
to claiming tax benefits was unlikely to have been foreseen by 
Congress.7  The ESD consists of a subjective inquiry into whether 
a taxpayer had a nontax purpose for entering a suspect 
transaction and an objective inquiry into whether the transaction 
accomplished anything beyond tax effects.8  If a transaction lacks 
the requisite economic substance, it is treated as a substantive 
sham and the taxpayer's claimed tax benefits are denied.9 
The ESD had been the most controversial of the judicially 
crafted approaches to tax-avoidance techniques, and the recent 
codification of ESD seems unlikely to resolve all of the issues.10  
First, the ESD's substantive content is problematic.11 For 
                                                          
norm.  See generally Leandra Lederman, A Tiskit, A Taskit: Basketing & Corporate Tax 
Shelters, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 557 (2011). 
 5. See Koppelman, supra note 3, at 684-85 & n.20. 
 6. See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2006 & Supp. 2010); see also discussion infra Part II (for an 
overview of the ESD) and Part IV.C (for examples of cases in which the ESD was at 
issue). 
 7. Charlene D. Luke, Risk, Return, and Objective Economic Substance, 27 VA. TAX 
REV. 783, 787 (2008) [hereinafter Luke, Risk Return]. 
 8. The new ESD Code section contains the same two inquiries.  See I.R.C. 
§ 7701(o)(1) (stating that the transaction must change a "taxpayer's economic position" "in 
a meaningful way" and a taxpayer must have a "substantial purpose (apart from Federal 
income tax effects)"). 
 9. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1).  It is considered a substantive sham because the 
taxpayer actually undertook the transaction giving rise to the claimed tax benefit.  See 
Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 788.  If a taxpayer did not actually enter into the 
transactions, the government would rely on factual sham or fraud arguments.  See id.  
The line between factual sham and substantive sham can at times be difficult to discern, 
especially in the case of certain financial transactions.  See id. (discussing factual shams). 
 The new ESD Code section continues the common law approach and even 
incorporates the common law by reference.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) ("The term 'economic 
substance doctrine' means the common law doctrine under which tax benefits . . . are not 
allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business 
purpose."). 
 10. See, e.g., Yoram Keinan, It is Time for the Supreme Court to Voice its Opinion on 
Economic Substance, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 93, 98 (2006) [hereinafter Keinan, Time to 
Voice] (discussing the inconsistent application of the doctrine between, and even among, 
the circuits). 
 11. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 442 (criticizing the economic substance doctrine 
because "the doctrine has evolved into one that asks the wrong questions and is easily 
manipulated"). 
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example, although courts assigned a key role to a transaction's 
pre-tax profit in determining whether a transaction had an 
objectively determinable economic effect, the courts did not reach 
consensus as to how to measure and use pre-tax profit.12  The 
new ESD Code section should help standardize the approach to 
pre-tax profit, but the section fails to grapple with the problems 
inherent in the pre-tax profit concept.13 
Second, the ESD's general role in tax planning and litigation 
remains unclear.  Courts, for example, have rarely expressly 
considered the ESD's status as an interpretive tool14 even when 
using the ESD to interpret tax statutes and other tax rules.15  
Codification of the ESD has not clarified the role of the doctrine.  
For example, although codification demonstrates legislative 
                                                          
 12. See id. at 435-37 (describing the "plethora of tests" used to evaluate pre-tax 
profits under the doctrine). 
 13. The new ESD Code section relies on whether "the present value of the 
reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the 
present value of the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction 
were respected."  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).  This approach, while likely to reduce the ability 
to manipulate pre-tax profit potential, does not lessen the problem of settling on a 
meaning of "substantial" and "reasonably."  The Code section also fails to account for the 
effect of implicit taxes on pre-tax profit. See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 793-98 
(discussing the problems inherent in a pre-tax profit inquiry).  Interpretive regulations 
may, of course, be issued to provide further guidance.  See id. 
 14. See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation; A 
Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 700-01, 709, 717-18 (2009) 
(suggesting courts use ESD loosely, placing more emphasis on the facts and on the 
purpose of the laws at issue).  Interpretive determinations are, of course, notoriously 
difficult and require their own theoretical framework.  See id. at 703-06.  In the tax area, 
such a framework is underdeveloped as evidenced in part by the current structure of most 
ESD decisions.  See Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax Shelter Regulation, 26 VA. 
TAX REV. 357, 384-85 (2006) (noting the paucity of theory about "what it means for a 
collective body  . . . to 'intend' something" and surmising that "[j]udicial efforts to fill in 
these gaps may be subjective guesswork").  For articles discussing possible approaches for 
interpreting tax legislation, see Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: 
Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 SMU L. REV. 9 (2001); Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting 
Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 (1995); Alan Gunn, Some 
Observations On the Interpretation Of the Internal Revenue Code, 63 TAXES 28 (1985); 
and Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986).  See also Lee Epstein, Nancy Staudt & Peter 
Wiedenbeck, Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a 
Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 305, 324 (2003) 
(describing empirical project looking at Supreme Court tax cases in order to "develop a 
richer and more systematic understanding of how judges interpret the Internal Revenue 
Code"). 
 15. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 389; see also Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The 
Requirement of Economic Profit In Tax Motivated Transactions, 59 TAXES 985, 989-91 
(1981) (discussing the problem of "imposing a non-statutory requirement of pretax 
profit . . . given the existence of specific statutory provisions"). 
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support for the use of the doctrine, the new Code section does not 
provide guidance as to when the ESD should be applied.16 
The lack of consensus about the ESD's content and role 
arguably makes the ESD an ideal subject for testing the possible 
usefulness of H-S in the tax shelter context.  This Article 
concludes that H-S could provide an organizing principle for 
anchoring the ESD's substantive content and defining its role.  
Thus, the H-S could be used to re-frame the current ESD, but, at 
the same time, the proposed H-S ESD would continue certain 
features of the current ESD, including some—business purpose, 
for example—that vex the ESD's critics.17 
In applying H-S to the ESD, this Article emphasizes the 
aspects of the H-S concept that appear most clearly related to the 
two inquiries required by the ESD.18  First, under H-S a cost 
outlay should not reduce the tax base unless it is sufficiently tied 
to a business or investment purpose.19 
Second, a cost outlay should not reduce the tax base unless it 
actually reduces wealth.20  Thus, the proposed H-S ESD would 
deny all claimed tax benefits if the transaction lacked a sufficient 
tie to a non-tax business or investment purpose.21  Even if the 
requisite connection were established, the transaction's tax 
consequences would be determined by using H-S principles to 
measure the actual economic changes caused by the 
transaction.22  As a consequence, a tax base reduction would 
                                                          
 16. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) ("The determination of whether the economic 
substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if 
this subsection had never been enacted."). See generally Bret Wells, Economic Substance 
Doctrine: How Codification Changes Decided Cases, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 411 (2010) 
(exploring extent to which the codified language may have altered outcomes in a selection 
of earlier cases). 
 17. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 2, at 416-19 (arguing the requirement of a 
business purpose is insufficient to detect and prevent abusive transactions). 
 18. Although, as the title to this Article suggests, H-S is susceptible to numerous 
interpretations; this Article argues that sufficient consensus exists to carry out the 
proposed analysis.  See infra note 164 and accompanying text.  The most hotly debated 
areas of H-S application are unlikely to appear in the tax shelter context.  For example, 
debate is particularly strong surrounding the deductibility under H-S of payments made 
by individuals in response to a hardship event or in support of a public good (e.g., the 
deductions for medical costs, casualty losses, and charitable contributions). 
 19. For a discussion of the similarity of this test to the subjective prong of the ESD, 
see infra Part IV.B. 
 20. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 21. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Beyond A GAAR: Retrofitting The Code To Rein In 
21st Century Tax Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 1721, 1738 (2003) [hereinafter McMahon, 
Beyond a GAAR] (stating that loss deductions for corporations must derived from a 
profit-seeking purpose). 
 22. See id. at 1731 (stating that "one must recognize that a codified economic 
substance doctrine that imposes a conjunctive test, requiring both a business purpose and 
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result only to the extent of actual economic loss.23  The proposed 
H-S ESD thus would move from disregarding an entire 
transaction as a substantive sham to taxing whatever was 
actually accomplished, and any inquiry into pre-tax profit 
potential would be confined to consideration of the transaction's 
business or investment connection.24 
Because the H-S ESD would require a fresh determination of 
a transaction's tax consequences, a court would need to decide 
whether legislative intent permits setting aside the taxpayer's 
claimed tax rules and using the H-S ESD to tax the transaction.25  
The H-S ESD would also apply if legislative intent is unknown or 
ambiguous as to a particular transaction—which, given the 
novelty of many tax–avoidance transactions, may occur 
frequently.26  Thus, the proposed H-S ESD would expressly 
function as a proxy for legislative intent in determining the final 
tax consequences of a suspect transaction.27  Using H-S to frame 
such a proxy has the benefit of using a principle widely 
incorporated throughout the tax system.28 
Application of the proposed H-S ESD to five case studies29 
suggests two additional possible benefits of thinking about 
tax-avoidance transactions in terms of H-S: it may help delineate 
the boundaries of the ESD's applicability to suspect transactions, 
and it may help explain the outcomes of ESD cases.  Given the 
immense literature on the ESD, any explanatory potential of H-S 
                                                          
a meaningful change in the taxpayer's economic position, is not a radical change at all, 
even if it imposes a more rigorous standard than some of the decided cases have applied"). 
 23. See id. at 1725-26. 
 24. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 25. This Article does not purport to address the theoretical uncertainty surrounding 
an interpretive framework for tax law.  See Galle, supra note 14.  In delineating a possible 
use of H-S in re-framing the ESD, this Article generally assumes that the ground has 
been cleared through the necessary legislative intent determinations.  This Article also 
assumes that proxies for legislative intent are a practical necessity.  But cf. Lederman, 
supra note 2, at 396-97 ("The dividing line is whether Congress intended to provide the 
claimed benefit or not.  While not necessarily an easy question to answer, it is the 
question that distinguishes abusive transactions from appropriate ones.  Any other test is 
simply a proxy for that inquiry."). 
 26. Cf. Lederman, supra note 2 (Part I discusses legislative intent; Part II C. 
discusses complexity of transaction in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 
(1978)); Hariton, When and How, supra note 27, at 30-31 (arguing that economic 
substance doctrine does not adequately address tax shelters). 
 27. Cf., Lederman, supra note 2 (discussing the importance of legislative intent); 
David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be Applied?, 
60 TAX L. REV. 29, 30-31 (2007)[hereinafter Hariton, When and How] (discussing intent). 
 28. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 29. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United 
States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); 
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001); Compaq 
Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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in this area could be of greater ultimate significance than 
whether the proposed H-S ESD were actually adopted.30 
These possible benefits appear to be tied to H-S's inherent 
limitations.  H-S, for example, is silent about important 
structural issues such as taxpayer identity and tax rates.31  
Further, the tax law frequently and intentionally departs from 
H-S; a handful of these intentional departures are likely 
necessary in order to have an administrable tax system.32  
Tax-avoidance techniques regularly make use of H-S 
discontinuities–whether structural gaps or deliberate 
departures—to generate or shift tax benefits.33  This Article's 
case study analysis suggests that government success in using 
the ESD may correspond to the ease with which an H-S result 
can be determined with respect to a transaction.  H-S may exert 
an unconscious influence over courts when they apply the ESD, 
or there may be traits or goals common to both H-S and the ESD.  
The proposed H-S ESD would formalize and emphasize a 
relationship between H-S and the ESD. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part II 
provides an overview of the ESD and of the controversies 
surrounding it.  Part III discusses H-S in greater detail and 
begins the exploration into the use of H-S to re-frame the ESD.  
Part IV describes the H-S ESD and discusses the case studies.  
Part V is the conclusion, including a summary of the case study 
results. 
II. ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE OVERVIEW 
The ESD generally consists of two inquiries — one subjective 
and the other objective.34  The subjective inquiry looks to 
taxpayer intent, especially the taxpayer's business purpose for 
entering the transaction.35  The objective inquiry analyzes 
whether the suspect transaction had an economic reality apart 
                                                          
 30. Since the ESD Code section specifies that whether the ESD "is relevant to a 
transaction shall be made in the same manner as if this subsection had never been 
enacted," study of when and how courts have used ESD is of obvious importance even 
after codification.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5) (2006 & Supp. 2010).  While the recent codification 
of the ESD admittedly lowers the likelihood of adoption of the H-S ESD, H-S could 
potentially serve a role in crafting interpretive regulations of the codified ESD (though 
discussion of such a role is outside the scope of this Article). 
 31. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 4 (Harv. 
Univ. Press 1985) (explaining that H-S does not specify the taxable unit or rate schedule). 
 32. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 33. With thanks to Larry Lokken for this insight. 
 34. See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 784. 
 35. See id. at 787. 
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from producing tax benefits.36  The doctrine has generated an 
extensive amount of discussion and disagreement.37  It was also 
the subject of numerous codification proposals38 before it was 
finally codified on March 30, 2010.39 
                                                          
 36. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (requiring 
"meaningful" change in "taxpayer's economic position"). 
 37. See Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 
(2000); Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a 
Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005); Galle, supra note 14, at 357-61; Hariton, 
When and How, supra note 27; David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic 
Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235 (1999) [hereinafter Hariton, Sorting Out]; Yoram Keinan, 
The Economic Substance Doctrine, TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS (2007); Lederman, supra note 
2, at 391-92; Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 793 n.30; Martin J. McMahon, Jr., 
Economic Substance, Purposive Activity, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 94 TAX NOTES 1017 
(2002) [hereinafter McMahon, Economic Substance]; Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Business 
Purpose: Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial Doctrines to Interpret the Internal 
Revenue Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 195 (2001). 
 38. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2010)); American 
Workers, State, and Business Relief Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. § 421 (2010); 
Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2010, S. 3018, 111th Cong. §§ 411-413 
(2010); to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a temporary payroll 
increase tax credit for certain employers, S. 2955, 111th Cong. §§ 231-233 (2010); 
Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2009, S. 1309, 111th Cong. § 202 
(2009); Julia Carson Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2009, H.R. 
2979, 111th Cong. § 204 (2009); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 1265, 111th Cong. § 401 
(2009); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. § 401 (2009); James Zadroga 9/11 
Health and Compensation Act of 2008, H.R. 7174, 110th Cong. § 301 (2008); Universal 
Homeowner Tax Cut Act of 2008, H.R. 5790, 110th Cong. § 211 (2008); AMT Relief Act of 
2007, H.R. 4351, 110th Cong. § 211 (2007); Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture 
Act of 2007, S. 2242, 110th Cong. § 511 (2007); Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, 
H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3501 (2007); Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act 
of 2007, H.R. 3395, 110th Cong. § 204 (2007); Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy 
Families Act of 2007, S. 1626, 110th Cong. § 204 (2007); Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown 
and Taxpayer Accountability Act of 2007, H.R. 2345, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007); Stop Tax 
Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 2136, 110th Cong. § 401 (2007); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 
681, 110th Cong. § 401 (2007); Export Products Not Jobs Act, S. 96, 110th Cong. § 201 
(2007); Nonitemizer Real Property Tax Deduction Act of 2006, S. 3738, 109th Cong. § 3 
(2006); Telephone Excise Tax Repeal Act of 2005, S. 1321, 109th Cong. § 801 (2005); Tax 
Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong. § 511 (2005); Tax Shelter Transparency and 
Enforcement Act, S. 1937, 108th Cong. § 101 (2003); Jumpstart Our Business Strength 
(JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 401 (2003); Rebuild America Act of 2003, S. 1409, 
108th Cong. § 1101 (2003); Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown and Taxpayer Accountability 
Act of 2003, H.R. 1555, 108th Cong. § 101 (2003); CARE Act of 2003, S. 476, 108th Cong. 
§ 701 (2003); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 
117 Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (West 2010)); 
American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 5095, 107th 
Cong. § 101 (2002); Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 2001, H.R. 2520, 107th Cong. 
§ 101 (2001); see also Small Business Tax Relief Act of 2000, H.R. 3874, 106th Cong. § 266 
(2000) (not dealing directly with economic substance but clear predecessor to such 
proposals); Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. § 2(b) 
(1999)(same); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-222, 120 Stat. 345 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2010)) 
(dealing with treatment of prohibited tax shelter transactions). 
 39. See I.R.C. § 7701(o). 
COPYRIGHT © 2011 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
116  HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI 
Putting to one side the benefits or detriments of 
codification,40 the ESD commentary can be roughly divided into 
(1) writing that assumes or advocates the continuance of ESD 
and analyzes specific aspects of the doctrine and (2) writing that 
considers more generally the ESD's role in tax litigation and tax 
policy.  This Part provides an overview of the ESD in conjunction 
with a discussion of the primary issues identified in both 
categories of writings. 
A. Stakes 
The ESD generally has all-or-nothing consequences for the 
taxpayer.  Thus, if the transaction survives application of the 
ESD, the claimed tax benefits survive (although, of course, 
nothing prevents some other test from toppling them).41  If the 
transaction fails application of the ESD, the transaction is 
treated as a substantive sham — that is, as though it did not 
occur in the first place.42  Codification of the ESD does not change 
this approach.43  The all-or-nothing consequences raise the stakes 
in the ongoing debate over particulars of the ESD.  As will be 
                                                          
 40. For a sampling of the discussion specific to the codification of the ESD, see 
Aprill, supra note 14; Jeremiah Coder, Korb Again Condemns Idea of Codifying Economic 
Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 29, 2007, available at 2007 TNT 209-6 
(LEXIS); Galle, supra note 14, at 387-402; David P. Hariton, Economic Substance 
Complaint No. 1: "Too Vague and Too Broad," TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 1, 2002, available 
at 2002 TNT 190-30 (LEXIS); New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Comments on 
Pending Tax Shelter Legislation, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 8, 2002, available at 2002 TNT 
195-89 (LEXIS); ABA Section on Taxation, ABA Tax Section Comments on Codification of 
Economic Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 13, 2007, available at 2007 TNT 
72-22 (LEXIS); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Economic Substance Codification Coming, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 10, 2007, available at 2007 TNT 196-3 (LEXIS); Mark J. Silverman 
et al., The Case Against Economic Substance Codification, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 20, 
2004, available at 2004 TNT 139-43 (LEXIS); Lawrence M. Stone, Congress Should Codify 
Economic Substance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 19, 2002, available at 2002 TNT 223-23 
(LEXIS); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Despite Widespread Opposition, Congress Should 
Codify the Economic Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 14, 2006, available at 
2006 TNT 30-38 (LEXIS); and Bernard Wolfman, Why Economic Substance is Better Left 
Uncodified, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 27, 2004, available at 2004 TNT 144-36 (LEXIS). 
 41. Cf. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (holding that a 
transaction was materially different and thus allowed the tax benefits to survived). 
 42. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 549 (5th Cir. 
2009) ("[T]he effect of disregarding a transaction for lack of economic substance is that, for 
taxation purposes, the transaction is viewed to have never occurred at all.").  It may be 
possible for a loan to be disaggregated from the suspect transaction, thus allowing some 
interest deductions.  See Rice's Toyota World, Inc., v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 95-96 (4th Cir. 
1985) (allowing taxpayer to deduct interest on a recourse not because "a sham transaction 
may contain elements whose form reflects economic substance and whose normal tax 
consequences may not therefore be disregarded").  See McMahon, Economic Substance, 
supra note 37, at 1020-21 n.15 (discussing Rice's Toyota World). 
 43. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (defining the ESD as the "common law doctrine under 
which tax benefits . . . are not allowable" if the transaction fails the test). 
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discussed below, these consequences serve to emphasize the 
artificiality of setting an acceptable amount of pre-tax profit that 
will transform a suspect transaction into an allowed or 
disallowed transaction.  The all-or-nothing ESD approach also 
provides an incentive to taxpayers to tweak aspects of a 
particular transaction so as to move it from failure to passing.44  
The proposed H-S ESD would tax a suspect transaction using 
H-S principles rather than treating the transaction as a 
substantive sham. 
B. Subjective Inquiry 
The subjective prong of the doctrine is a business purpose 
test.45  The test is aimed at investigating a taxpayer's non-tax 
reasons for entering into the suspect transaction.46  It frequently 
becomes a test about taxpayer motive47 — about why the 
taxpayer did what it did.  Of course, even if determination of that 
                                                          
 44. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 262 (3rd Cir. 1998) (discussing how a 
transaction that was not intended to serve business purposes may still give rise to a 
deduction if it has an objective economic consequence). 
 45. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B) (requiring taxpayer to have a "substantial purpose 
(apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such a transaction"); Bankman, 
supra note 37, at 27 (explaining that subjective prong is "sometimes simply referred to as 
the business purpose requirement"). 
 Business purpose traces its historical roots to the Gregory decision, which denied the 
taxpayer the benefits of a reorganization undertaken for tax reasons.  See Gregory v. 
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).  The Supreme Court purported, however, to reach its 
decision without regard to taxpayer motive: "But the question for determination is 
whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute 
intended."  Id. at 469.  Thus, it is fair to say that the appellate and Supreme Court 
decisions in Gregory only built a business purpose requirement with respect to 
reorganizations. See id. at 467.  Because the Gregory business purpose was reorganization 
specific, the case had sometimes been raised to support the notion that a more generalized 
business purpose requirement was not supported by the Code.  See Marvin A. Chirelstein, 
Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L. J. 440, 446 (1968) 
("Hand's approach, which the Supreme Court adopted . . . was thus merely to interpret 
the language of the statute; that is, to construe . . . the definition of a 'reorganization' 
whose meaning had theretofore been obscure."); Lederman, supra note 2, at 419 
(explaining that Learned Hand required that "the form in which the transaction was 
carried out—had to be germane to the business of one corporation or the other" and that 
both the Supreme Court and Judge Hand "found that Congress implicitly required a 
business purpose to qualify under the reorganization statute in issue"). 
 The newly codified ESD provision, of course, now provides express legislative 
approval of such a requirement.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B).  It also applies to an 
individual "only [as] to transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or 
an activity engaged in for the production of income."  Id. § 7701(o)(5)(B). 
 46. See Bankman, supra note 37, at 27 ("The subjective leg of the economic 
substance doctrine looks to the taxpayer's expectations and motives . . . ."). 
 47. See Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 
U. CHI. L. REV. 485 (1967) (discussing the extent to which differences in meaning between 
"motive," "intent," and "purpose" matter in the tax law). 
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motive is in some sense "subjective" it must be determined 
through objective analysis of the evidence.48  The evidence may 
include internal memoranda, meeting minutes, and e-mails.49  It 
will also include affidavits or other statements.50  Post-audit 
statements regarding non-tax motive will be viewed with greater 
skepticism than contemporaneous evidence.51  Consideration will 
also be given to whether the taxpayer's stated motive was 
supported by the facts of the transaction.52  For example, if the 
taxpayer asserts that its non-tax purpose was to make a pre-tax 
profit, but objective analysis of the facts demonstrates that such 
a profit was impossible, the court should find that the taxpayer 
lacked the requisite non-tax purpose.53 
Taxpayers are, of course, well aware of the business purpose 
test.  A frequent criticism of the subjective prong of the ESD is 
that its principal effects, both in planning and after an audit, are 
to give taxpayers incentives to manufacture business purpose, to 
conceal tax-avoidance motives, and to groom supporting 
evidentiary trails.54 
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that taxpayers do 
engage in such behavior, its full extent remains an open 
question.55  If taxpayers do engage in generating business 
purpose, whether such a ploy works depends on the perspicacity 
of the court.56  As will be discussed in Part IV, the proposed H-S 
                                                          
 48. Bankman, supra note 37, at 27 ("The subjective intent or business purpose 
doctrine must inevitably look to objective indicia of intent . . . ."). 
 49. Id. at 27 ("The subjective intent or business purpose doctrine must inevitably 
look to objective indicia of intent: contemporaneous documents, evidence of meetings, and 
the like."); Klamath v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 545 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 50. See Hock v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 406, 412 (1987). 
 51. See TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94, 111 (D. Conn. 2004), 
rev'd, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006) ("In evaluating the economic substance of a transaction, 
courts are cautioned to give more weight to objective facts than self-serving testimony . . . 
Were the executives' testimony the only evidence before me, I am not sure how persuaded 
I would be of [the taxpayer's] motives."). 
 52. See Klamath, 568 F.3d at 545 ("The evidence clearly shows that [the taxpayers] 
designed the loan transactions and the investment strategy so that no reasonable 
possibility of profit existed and so that the funding amount would create massive tax 
benefits but would never actually be at risk."). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Bankman, supra note 37, at 27 ("A primary criticism of the business 
purpose test is that it leads to the creation of false or misleading documents that evidence 
nontax motives."); Lederman, supra note 2, at 433 ("[T]axpayers can easily generate 
evidence of a business purpose, [so] courts should not use it as a test for determining if a 
transaction is abusive."). 
 55. See Bankman, supra note 37, at 28 (discussing "how few steps 
shelter-participants in litigated cases took to establish nontax motives" and adding that 
"the creation of a false paper trail [may be] harder than it sounds"). 
 56. In ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 1998), there was a 
clear attempt to create business purpose.  For example, the parent corporation 
COPYRIGHT © 2011 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
2011] WHAT WOULD HENRY SIMONS DO? 119 
ESD does maintain a role for business purpose, but one that is 
anchored to the H-S principle. 
C. Objective Prong 
The objective prong purports to set taxpayer intention aside 
and to investigate whether the suspect transaction caused any 
non-tax economic consequences.57  Discussion focusing on the 
objective prong tends to center on measurement questions—
specifically what attribute(s) should be measured to determine 
whether a transaction has an economic reality apart from tax 
effects and how many of the selected attribute(s) should be 
sufficient to save a transaction.58  By far the most prominent 
candidate for a testing attribute has been pre-tax profit 
potential.59  Other contenders include the overall risk of the 
transaction60 (including the presence or absence of contingencies) 
and the normalcy of the transaction in terms of the taxpayer's 
business.61 
If profit is used in assessing whether the taxpayer 
experienced economic change, the central issue has been how 
much profit should be enough to satisfy the objective prong.62  
Various tests have been put forward, two of which made frequent 
appearances in ESD legislative proposals.  The first would 
require a minimum threshold of pre-tax profit tied to the 
                                                          
(Colgate-Palmolive) had ACM engage both in a tax shelter transaction and in purchasing 
some of Colgate-Palmolive's debt in order to "rebalance [Colgate's] debt profile" and make 
Colgate look less heavily leveraged.  See id. at 234-35.  The courts easily separated the 
two transactions.  See id. at 240. 
 57. The new ESD Code section requires that "the transaction change in a 
meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position."  
I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 58. See Bankman, supra note 37, at 23 (raising questions of "[h]ow much substance 
is enough? If substance is measured by pretax rate of return, what rate of return is high 
enough to give a transaction substance?"). 
 59. See Michael S. Knoll, Compaq Redux: Implicit Taxes and The Question of 
Pre-Tax Profit, 26 VA. TAX REV. 821, 824 (2007) (noting that the "pre-tax profit test" is 
"frequently the centerpiece of the objective prong"). 
 60. See Hariton, When and How, supra note 27, at 53-54 (advocating an approach 
that examines a transaction for "unique economic risk"); Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, 
at 804 (suggesting comparables analysis tied to risk for analyzing return on a suspect 
transaction); see also Knoll, supra note 59, at 854-55 (describing the Fifth Circuit's use of 
risk in the Compaq transaction). 
 61. See Bankman, supra note 37, at 17 (discussing court cases suggesting "that 
transactions tied to ordinary business operations will be favorably treated under the 
economic substance doctrine"). 
 62. In addition, the use of pre-tax profit as a metric suffers from technical 
limitations caused by the presence of implicit taxes and implicit subsidies.  See Charlotte 
Crane, Some Explicit Thinking About Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REV. 339, 350-60 (1999); 
David A. Weisbach, Implications of Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REV. 373, 374-78 (1999); 
Knoll, supra note 59, at 833-38; Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 793. 
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risk-free rate of return.63  The second is a more qualitative 
comparison between the anticipated profits and anticipated tax 
benefits.64  The new ESD Code section takes the latter, 
qualitative approach.65  Although both approaches have pros and 
cons, it is fair to say that such approaches remain unanchored to 
any readily stated normative principle.66 
Even if a transaction generates no actual pre-tax profit, it 
would be problematic to treat a transaction as automatically 
failing the objective prong of the ESD.  The taxpayer may have 
entered into an economically substantive transaction that simply 
failed to produce.67  As a result, the pre-tax profit inquiry also 
generally requires analysis of profit potential.68  As will be 
discussed in Part IV, under the proposed H-S ESD, actual 
outcomes would determine tax consequences, and profit potential 
would be implicated only insofar as it related to the taxpayer's 
business purpose. 
Courts do not rely solely on an analysis of pre-tax profit and 
often review other indicators.69  Analysis of such other factors 
does not appear to be foreclosed by the new ESD Code section, 
which only provides that if pre-tax potential is used, it must have 
                                                          
 63. See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 795. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (Profit potential is only taken 
into account "if the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the 
transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits 
that would be allowed if the transaction were respected."). 
 66. See Knoll, supra note 59, at 851-54 (describing various approaches to pre-tax 
profit); Warren, supra note 15, at 987 (describing the "inherent dilemma" in using pretax 
profit). 
 In a previous article, this author argued for a market-based approach to the 
measurement problem and assumed the continued vitality of ESD.  See Luke, Risk 
Return, supra note 7, at 809.  This current Article explores a more fundamental 
re-framing of the ESD. 
 67. See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 793; cf. Hariton, Sorting Out, supra note 
37, at 249 ("[A] taxpayer can derive significant profit from transactions which lack both 
business purpose and economic substance . . . . Indeed, where a tax-motivated transaction 
takes the form of an investment, the taxpayer can always contribute enough net equity to 
assure that there will be significant net profit (even after taking transaction costs into 
account)."). 
 68. See Hariton, Sorting Out, supra note 37, at 249 ("[T]he potential for meaningful 
profit correlates with the presence of both business purpose and economic substance.").  
Of course, if the claimed pre-tax profit potential is illusory given the certainty of loss, the 
transaction will fail the ESD.  See id. at 250. 
 69. See United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (discussing how insurance and re-insurance policies reduced but did not 
"completely foreclose the risk of loss"); cf. TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 
2d 94, 109-10 (D. Conn. 2004), rev'd, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that the 
government raised the lack of risk to support their contention that the suspect 
transaction lacked "economic reality"). 
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a "substantial" relationship to after-tax benefits.70  Such other 
indicators generally include analysis of the risks or contingencies 
built into the transaction.  This risk/contingency analysis 
becomes a way to authenticate that the transaction actually 
happened by determining the extent to which the taxpayer's 
claimed pre-tax profit potential or claimed tax benefits were 
locked in.71 Courts may also consider the relationship of the 
transaction to the taxpayer's regular business activities, and 
there appears to be a reluctance to treat transactions as economic 
shams if they have a direct link to day-to-day operations or 
involve seemingly neutral third parties.72  Under the proposed 
H-S ESD, consideration of such relationships would be a factor in 
assessing business purpose, but the transaction would ultimately 
be taxed using H-S principles.73 
D. Relationship of the Inquiries 
Whether the two inquiries of the ESD should operate 
conjunctively, disjunctively, or as mere components of a unitary 
purposive test had also generated some discussion and variance 
in the court opinions.74  Most commonly, however, courts 
required taxpayers to satisfy both inquiries in order to have 
transactions respected,75 and that is the approach taken in the 
codified ESD.76 
                                                          
 70. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 71. See Knoll, supra note 59, at 855 ("If a transaction yields an expected before-tax 
loss, then the taxpayer, by eliminating all risk, ensures that it will suffer a before-tax 
loss.  In that case, the taxpayer's risk reduction activities strengthen the government's 
argument . . . . Conversely, if a transaction yields a before-tax profit, then by eliminating 
risk the taxpayer ensures that it will enjoy a before-tax profit."). 
 72. See United Parcel Serv., 254 F.3d at 1019 ("[A] transaction has a 'business 
purpose,' when we are talking about a going concern like UPS, as long as it figures in a 
bona fide, profit-seeking business. . . . This concept of 'business purpose' is a necessary 
corollary to the venerable axiom that tax-planning is permissible."); see also Lederman, 
supra note 2, at 401 (noting that courts are unlikely to use the ESD to disregard 
transactions "that are integrated into taxpayer's business"). 
 73. Compare I.R.C. § 7701(o), which takes an all-or-nothing 
approach.  See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Bankman, supra note 37, at 26 ("[C]ourts have also stated that a 
transaction that has objective economic substance will be respected for tax purposes, 
regardless of the taxpayer's motivation.  Courts are split as to whether a transaction that 
has subjective but not objective economic substance should be respected for tax 
purposes."); see also Galle, supra note 14, at 388 (noting continuing debate over 
relationship of the ESD components). 
 75. See Knoll, supra note 59, at 824 (noting that ESD is usually stated in its 
conjunctive form). 
 76. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1). 
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E. ESD's Role in Tax Shelter Litigation 
Use of the term "tax shelter" to label tax-reduction 
techniques is commonplace, but there is widespread 
disagreement about what type of transaction should be tarnished 
with the tax shelter brush and what consequences should follow 
from such a designation.77 
The ESD as a whole has been susceptible to the argument 
that "tax shelter" must be defined before the ESD can be 
reformed.78  This susceptibility arises primarily because the ESD 
remains unanchored to a normative framework and thus, 
arguably, the ESD can be expanded or narrowed to reflect one's 
view about what should constitute a tax shelter.79  Codification of 
the ESD seems unlikely to significantly resolve this problem 
since the provision operates primarily by incorporating the 
common law ESD.80  Although this Article agrees that the ESD 
remains in need of an anchor, tying the ESD to a normative "tax 
shelter" concept could have the ancillary consequence of 
legitimizing tax-reduction techniques missed by the ESD.81  That 
is, an ESD so closely aligned with "tax shelters" could create the 
presumption that any transactions missed by such a tax-shelter 
ESD must be respected by the courts.82 
The very real possibility of missing problematic transactions 
through defining "tax shelter" and then anchoring the ESD to 
that definition makes obvious the central problem of such an 
approach.  It is premised on the notion that it is possible to come 
up with an essentialist definition of "tax shelter" even though the 
underlying landscape is constantly shifting.83  On the other hand, 
if one is content with a more pragmatic approach, "tax shelter" 
                                                          
 77. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 398-400 (describing "extensive discussion" on 
term "tax shelter" and explaining that "not everyone agrees on what known transactions 
should be contained within the scope of the term"). 
 78. Cf. David P. Hariton, How to Define 'Corporate Tax Shelter', 84 TAX NOTES 883, 
883-84 (1999) [hereinafter Hariton, How to Define] (arguing in response to various 
"proposals for dealing with corporate tax shelters" that "[b]efore we can do anything 
constructive about corporate tax shelters . . . we must reach some general consensus 
regarding the kinds of transactions we are trying to stop"). 
 79. See generally id. at 883 (describing how tax shelter may be broadly or narrowly 
defined). 
 80. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A), (C) (defining the ESD in terms of the common law and 
failing to specify when the ESD should be considered relevant). 
 81. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 399-400 (arguing that "the judicial tools used in 
response to abusive transactions should not be limited to the tax shelter context" since 
"[t]he government has a legitimate interest in fighting all abusive tax behavior"). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. at 400 (arguing "the form that tax shelters take may change over time, 
making the tax-shelter determination a moving target"). 
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may be defined as whatever Congress, or its surrogate, identifies 
as such.84 
Congress, of course, is no more capable of addressing every 
transactional permutation in advance85 than a tax shelter 
definition would be.86  Thus, a pragmatic approach requires 
accepting that other government actors have an expansive ability 
to generate proxies for and guesses about congressional action 
and intent.  This ability consists of intricate delegations of 
interpretive and decisional authority to agencies and to courts,87 
and this delegation is followed by the opportunity for Congress to 
refine or reject Code interpretations advanced by other 
governmental actors.88  Even if it were not clear before 
codification of the ESD, the addition of the ESD to the Code has 
made clear that administrative agencies and courts are 
authorized by Congress to invoke the doctrine.89 
Even less stringent criticisms of the ESD reflect the notion 
that the ESD is not a sufficiently refined mechanism for 
determining legislative intent.90  While codification has put to 
                                                          
 84. Cf. Hariton, When and How, supra note 27, at 37 ("The hardest job a court has 
in the case of a tax-motivated transaction that lacks business purpose and economic 
substance is determining whether the purported tax results of the transaction are 
reasonably consistent with congressional intent."). 
 85. See Hariton, Sorting Out, supra note 37, at 237 ("No agency can foresee, let 
alone draft, rules to govern coherently every conceivable permutation of facts and 
circumstances in an increasingly complex business world."). 
 86. See Zelenak, supra note 14, at 634-35. For example, it raises the conundrum of 
how to determine legislative intent with respect to a transaction that had not even been 
invented at the time Congress enacted the provisions claimed by a taxpayer to govern 
such transaction.  See id. 
 87. See Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 
131, 135 (2001) ("The courts and the Treasury have long played a significant role in 
making tax law, with Congress' acquiescence."); McMahon, Economic Substance, supra 
note 37, at 1025 ("[E]nforcement through litigation always will focus on interpreting the 
code and regulations consistently with the expressed policy of Congress, and when that 
policy is not explicitly expressed, consistently with the policy underpinnings of the 
statutory pattern."); see also supra notes 14, 18 and accompanying text (arguing how the 
agencies and courts should determine legislative intent is a problem in its own right); 
Zelenak, supra note 14, at 634 (noting although "[t]he weight of judicial authority favors 
an intent-based theory of interpretation," there are "logical difficulties" with such a 
position).  The discussion in the main text assumes an interpretive theory grounded in 
legislative intent, but, of course, interpretive theories may also be more focused on 
audience.  See id. at 635-36 (contrasting legislative intent approaches with reader-focused 
approaches). 
 88. See Bankman, supra note 37, at 11 ("A related, though somewhat stronger, 
claim is that the legislature assumes that long-standing common law doctrines such as 
economic substance will be used to interpret the statutes it enacts."). 
 89. See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (dictating the circumstances in which a 
transaction will be treated as having "economic substance"). 
 90. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 396-97 ("The dividing line is whether Congress 
intended to provide the claimed benefit or not.  While not necessarily an easy question to 
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rest the notion that Congress does not approve the use of the 
ESD, the new Code provision is fairly skeletal.  Indeed, it defines 
the economic substance doctrine in terms of the common law 
doctrine.91  As a result, courts will continue to be required to 
make at least two determinations related to legislative intent: (1) 
that there is legislative ambiguity or silence about the taxpayer's 
claimed application of the tax law; and (2) that the ESD is an 
appropriate tool for resolving that ambiguity or silence.92 
Courts have often applied the ESD without voicing 
consideration as to the ESD's status as a proxy for legislative 
intent.  This practice seems unlikely to change since the new 
Code section specifies that the relevance of the ESD is 
determined "in the same manner as if" the Code section "had 
never been enacted."93  Prior to codification, courts made a 
(usually) tacit decision that government litigators had 
appropriately raised the ESD, perhaps because the taxpayer had 
engaged in an unusual series of steps yielding a substantial tax 
benefit.94  The ESD has then been applied, and passage or failure 
yielded an all-or-nothing tax consequence to the taxpayer.95  The 
result then served effectively to confirm or disaffirm the 
appropriateness of using the ESD in the first place.96 
Thus, even though the ESD has functionally served to 
determine legislative intent with respect to a particular 
transaction,97 the process by which it does so has been only 
loosely tied to any formal method for making such a 
                                                          
answer, it is the question that distinguishes abusive transactions from appropriate 
ones."). 
 91. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) ("The term 'economic substance doctrine' means the 
common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A with respect to a 
transaction are not allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks 
a business purpose."). 
 92. See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 37, at 11-12 (arguing "that a transaction that is 
clearly supported by the text, intent, and purpose . . . will withstand judicial scrutiny 
regardless of whether it otherwise meets the economic substance test."). 
 93. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 94. See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 787 (explaining that the ESD is 
generally invoked when "the specific result of the transaction . . . is unlikely to have been 
foreseen by Congress or regulators"); McMahon, Economic Substance, supra note 37, at 
1018 ("Tax shelter transactions generally take advantage of the combination and 
interaction of several different, often seemingly unrelated, highly specific rules."). 
 95. See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 37, at 10 (stating the ESD has been applied "to 
deny interest deductions on corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) to Winn-Dixie Stores, 
to deny foreign tax credits to Compaq Computer"). 
 96. See id. at 11-12 (implying that application of ESD can be challenged through 
statute). 
 97. See id. at 11 ("The economic substance doctrine, like the other common law tax 
doctrines, can thus perhaps best be thought of as a method of statutory interpretation."). 
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determination.98  Codification has solved only the more general 
issue of whether the courts could use the ESD to set aside a 
transaction; it leaves unresolved most of the important questions 
surrounding when and how the ESD should be applied to 
evaluate a transaction purportedly governed by a specific set of 
tax rules.  Of course, taxpayers have a tremendous incentive to 
argue that Congress intended them to have benefit of the claimed 
authorities,99 and thus, a court's failure to address specifically 
the question of legislative intent as to a particular set of tax rules 
may have little effect on the outcome.100 
An examination of legislative intent also requires a 
determination that the ESD rather than another common law 
tool should be utilized.101  Here, again, court cases fail to provide 
meaningful guidance regarding how the ESD fits with other 
judicial tools that similarly function independently of a 
particular Code provision.102 
These tools include the step-transaction doctrine and other 
permutations of the substance-over-form doctrine.103  In practice, 
                                                          
 98. See id. ("It is in one sense odd to think of the economic substance doctrine as an 
interpretive method.  This is because the doctrine is only loosely connected to more 
conventional interpretive techniques or approaches."); Hariton, When and How, supra 
note 27, at 38-39 (describing failures of courts to address congressional intent directly in 
economic substance cases). 
 99. See Bankman, supra note 37, at 11 ("A transaction attacked through the 
economic substance doctrine will invariably be defended on the grounds that the 
transaction is supported by the statute's text, and generally by some combination of 
intent and purpose as well."). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. at 12 (listing other alternate common law doctrines). 
 102. The decision in Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. 
N.J. 2009), is illustrative.  The court determined that disregarding the taxpayer's 
transaction was appropriate under each of three approaches: substance-over-form 
analysis, the economic substance doctrine, and direct inquiry into congressional intent.  
Id. at 223.  But the court failed to explain why each approach was considered or how the 
approaches related to each other.  See Mark J. Silverman & Amanda P. Varma, The 
Future of Tax Planning from Coltec to Schering-Plough, 126 TAX NOTES 341, 342 (2010) 
(describing court's analysis in Schering-Plough as "fundamentally flawed" and criticizing 
it for engaging in inquiries in addition to its general substance-over-form analysis); see 
also Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The New Normal: Economic Substance Doctrine First, 126 
TAX NOTES 521, 521 (2010) (arguing that IRS fail to press grounds other than the ESD 
and that courts tend to go along with the IRS).  The new ESD Code provision does not 
address the ESD's relationship to other common law doctrines.  Prior versions specified 
that codified ESD "shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any other rule of 
law."  Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. § 452 (2010) (in a subsection 
titled "other common law doctrines not affected"). 
 103. See Yoram Keinan, Rethinking the Role of the Judicial Step Transaction 
Principle and a Proposal for Codification, 22 AKRON TAX J. 45, 45 (2007) [hereinafter 
Keinan, Rethinking the Role] (discussing step transaction doctrine as well as other 
"'common law' doctrines, such as substance over form . . . sham transaction, and economic 
substance"); Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 788-90 (discussing general 
substance-over-form analysis). 
COPYRIGHT © 2011 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
126  HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI 
however, courts consider these doctrines in tandem with the ESD 
and have used them to deny claimed tax benefits as to 
transactions when application of the ESD was problematic.104 
Predictably, the common law ESD's loose relationship to 
legislative intent occasionally gave rise to indignation about 
judicial over-reaching and overt advocacy for a stricter textualist 
approach to the tax law.105  Such textualist arguments for 
abolishment often had a strong tax-protester flavor106 and should 
be put to rest by codification of the ESD.  More interesting are 
arguments calling for rejection of the ESD on other grounds.107  
Professors Chirelstein & Zelenak argue that the current 
approach to tax shelter litigation, including the ESD, causes the 
government to "always be playing catch up."108  They have 
advocated codification of a "hindsight rule" that "would flatly 
disallow noneconomic losses and noneconomic deferrals through 
the use of foreign (and other tax-indifferent) counterparties."109  
As will be discussed in Part IV, this Article suggests a result that 
shares much in common with their proposal.  The proposed H-S 
ESD is also based on outcomes and requires that tax losses be 
supported by actual economic losses.110  This Article's proposal, 
however, continues to envision a role for business purpose as 
anchored by the H-S concept. 
Professor Lederman has recently argued that the ESD is an 
unnecessary, incoherent middleman, and she argues that the 
courts should instead ask directly about legislative intent rather 
than rely on proxies; however, she also recognizes the need to 
                                                          
 104. See infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the appellate decision in Castle Harbour); 
Bankman, supra note 37, at 12 (noting that the common law doctrines overlap and 
reinforce one another). 
 105. See Galle, supra note 14, at 366-70 (discussing the "textualist challenge to 
economic substance"). 
 106. See Gergen, supra note 87, at 135 (describing argument that the IRS should 
"look to Congress and not to the courts" as "frivolous at this level of generality"); see, e.g., 
Hariton, Sorting Out, supra note 37, at 238 (differentiating proponents of an objective 
determination of tax liability from "practitioners [who support] . . . a judicious sprinkling 
of standards throughout a fundamentally objective set of statutes and regulations"). 
 107. See, e.g., Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 37, at 1962 ("[T]he economic 
substance doctrine is simply too weak a barrier to protect the collection of income tax from 
assault by abusive shelter planners."); Lederman, supra note 2, at 442 ("Although courts 
often use the current economic substance doctrine to reach appropriate outcomes—
disallowance of tax benefits claimed in abusive transactions—the doctrine has evolved 
into one that asks the wrong questions and is easily manipulated."). 
 108. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 37, at 1951. 
 109. See id. at 1952.  For a more thorough discussion of the approach advocated by 
Professor Chirelstein and Professor Zelenak, see Galle, supra note 14, at 370. 
 110. Cf. Hariton, How to Define, supra note 78, at 889 (explaining that the "very 
essence of a tax shelter" is to create a transaction that "result[s] in relatively little change 
in the taxpayer's economic position"). 
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develop a framework for ascertaining legislative intent.111  The 
proposed H-S ESD similarly requires development of such a 
theoretical framework for its implementation,112 but because the 
proposed H-S ESD would require a fresh determination of a 
transaction's tax consequences, that need should become more 
apparent.  Although development of such a theoretical 
framework is outside the scope of this Article, the proposed H-S 
ESD would function as the final step in such a framework 
because it would apply after a determination that legislative 
intent did not support (or was ambiguous or silent as to) the tax 
rules utilized in a suspect transaction.  The proposed H-S ESD 
would, thus, function as a proxy for legislative intent, but it 
would be tied to a well-established principle. 
III. THE HAIG-SIMONS PRINCIPLE 
This Part provides an overview of the Haig-Simons (H-S) 
concept.  In spite of its widespread influence on tax law, it is fair 
to say that no two writers interpreting the H-S will explain it in 
precisely the same manner.113  Further, some notable tax authors 
have argued that the H-S is so subjective and ambiguous as to be 
practically meaningless. 114  Clearly, a question as open-ended as 
"What would Henry Simons do?" can be answered in multiple 
ways.115  In this Article, the H-S is presented as a pragmatic 
principle116 that is anchored to the ability-to-pay concept of 
                                                          
 111. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 442-44. 
 112. See supra notes 14 and 30 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Boris Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal 
Expenditures, 16 J.L. & ECON. 193, 197-98 (1973) [hereinafter Bittker, Income Tax 
Deductions] ("[T]erms like 'income' and 'consumption' are irretrievably ambiguous."). 
 114. See id; see also Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should 
the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
1389, 1404 (2004) ("[F]or as long as the Haig-Simons idea has been in existence, academic 
theorists have been debating whether it serves as a useful guidepost in formulating 
concrete tax-reform proposals."); Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 
45, 46 (1990) ("Despite its wide acceptance, Haig-Simons income remains elusive and 
ambiguous . . . . [S]ome writers have questioned whether the Haig-Simons formulation is, 
at base, a coherent one."). 
 115. See Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 55 ("[T]here could be as many ideas as to what 
income is as there are people to make the judgment, perhaps more."). 
 116. See Haig, supra note 3, at 76 ("The definition [of income] must be broad enough 
to iron out all the theoretical difficulties and solve all of the inequities and anomalies.  
The situation should be held in a mobile, flexible state which will permit the statutory 
definition of income to become progressively more precise and accurate with the 
improvement of the technique of our economic environment."); see also Thuronyi, supra 
note 114, at 61 ("Income is not an 'elegant' concept.  It is by its nature highly practical, 
flexible, and ad hoc."). 
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fairness.117  While the account of the H-S principle presented in 
this Article will undoubtedly not be accepted by all readers, it is 
anticipated that this Article's version is sufficiently mainstream 
so as to render meaningful this Article's conclusions. 
A. Overview 
The most famous H-S definition is the one authored by 
Henry Simons: 
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic 
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the 
store of property rights between the beginning and 
end of the period in question.  In other words, it is 
merely the result obtained by adding consumption 
during the period to 'wealth' at the end of the 
period and then subtracting 'wealth' at the 
beginning.118 
Simons' definition should not (and cannot) be taken at face value.  
The H-S definition, as is implicit in Simons' own explanation, is 
not intended simply as a positive description of income but as a 
normative principle requiring implementation of conforming 
standards and rules.119 
                                                          
 117. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure 
Analysis and Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 457 (2008) ("Obviously, 
[H-S] is a way of describing an individual's taxpaying ability.  Thus, [H-S] is generally 
understood to be based on the ability-to-pay principle and as a formula for implementing 
that principle."); Haig, supra note 3, at 75 ("It is very undesirable from the point of view of 
economics and equity that the judicial definition of income should develop along narrow 
lines . . . ."); R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 48 
(1967) ("The defense for the accretion plus consumption concept as an index of equality 
must rest on its superiority as an equity concept, not as a tool of economic theory."); 
Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 49 ("A careful reading of Simons suggests, however, that he 
did intend his definition to flow, at least in part, from judgments about tax equity."); see 
also SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 72 ("[T]he overwhelming majority of tax 
expenditure programs disproportionately benefit the upper-income groups.  Not only are 
the tax expenditure provisions the primary cause of perceived tax inequity, but it also 
seems safe to say that they fail to achieve what most Americans would perceive to be a 
fair distribution of funds . . . ."). 
 118. SIMONS, supra note 3, at 50; see also Haig, supra note 3, at 75 ("The formal 
definition of economic income, which . . . provides the most acceptable concept of income, 
may be stated as follows: Income is the money-value of the net accretion to economic power 
between two points of time."). 
 119. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992) (explaining that the primary difference between the two is the 
degree of ex ante certainty); Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax 
Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REV. 722, 723 (1990) ("The definition of a tax base developed by 
Haig and refined by Simons has become the normative standard for evaluating income tax 
rules."); Musgrave, supra note 117, at 47 ("Professor Bittker's impression that the 
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A simple example illustrates the basic contours of Simons' 
definition.  Assume that during a particular tax period Jane wins 
$100,000 of cash on a game show, spends $50,000 of it on a 
luxury vacation, and saves $50,000 of it.  Assuming she has no 
other receipts or outlays, Jane would have to pay tax on 
$100,000.  To put it in more formal H-S terms, Jane would have 
$50,000 of consumption and $50,000 of increased wealth. 
At one point in time, however, the tax consequences to Jane 
would not have been so clear.120  In the early years of the income 
tax, it was debated whether nonrecurring windfalls should be 
treated differently from regularly recurring earned income.121  
This notion was attacked by the contributors to H-S,122 and case 
law gradually foreclosed any possibility of a windfall exclusion.123  
                                                          
advocates of the comprehensive base waver between various income concepts—including 
aggregate gross income minus certain expenses, personal income as defined by the 
Department of Commerce, as well as the accretion concept—is mistaken.  As the 
literature clearly shows, it is the accretion concept which people have in mind, and not the 
other two, which have no normative value."). 
 120. See Robertson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Utah 1950) (excluding 
prize from income), rev'd, 190 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 711 (1952). 
 121. See Haig, supra note 3, at 69 ("[O]ne must go back as far as the fifteenth 
century, when, with an agricultural society where few fortuitous gains developed, the idea 
of receipts as being annual in character became deeply impressed upon the minds of the 
people.  It became the habit to think of one's regular receipts as his income, and to 
consider irregular receipts as additions to capital."). 
 122. See SIMONS, supra note 3, at 74-79 (explaining that Schanz "quite thoroughly" 
criticized the recurrence criterion and stating that "[t]he quite arbitrary character of the 
criterion of recurrence hardly merits further comment"). 
 The recurrence criterion and other closely related criteria were, of course, not the 
only concept of income that circulated and that was rejected by H-S.  Henry Simons, for 
example, devoted an entire chapter to the subject "Other Definitions and Their 
Limitations."  See id. at 59-102; see also Richard Goode, The Economic Definition of 
Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 1, 3-7 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977) 
(describing other proposed income definitions); Koppelman, supra note 3, at 683-84. 
 The recurrence criterion is, however, arguably the only income concept other than H-
S to be litigated and to still have a foothold in the Code, as evidenced by the exclusion 
from income of certain types of windfalls (e.g., life insurance proceeds, bequests).  See 
Joseph M. Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw Glass: Towards a Modern Concept of Gross 
Income, in TAX STORIES 17, 34-36 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Dodge, 
Glenshaw Glass] (explaining that this "theory of capital and income left behind some 
residue that has persisted to the present day"). 
 123. See Dodge, Glenshaw Glass, supra note 122, at 34-35 (describing case law and 
stating "upon reflection it is evident that any exclusion for non-recurring receipts would 
be antithetical to rational and even-handed administration by the Service and the 
courts"). 
 The Supreme Court decided that prizes such as the one received by Jane, from the 
example in the main text, were income in Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 713 
(1952).  While the district court held the prize was excluded, it did so on the theory that it 
constituted a gift and not expressly on the notion of a windfall exclusion.  See id. at 713 & 
n.2; see also Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S 509, 515 (1921) 
(rejecting taxpayer argument that an increase in the value of stock between its purchase 
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The Supreme Court firmly put the idea to rest in its famous 
Glenshaw Glass decision.124  As every graduate of a basic tax 
course knows (or should know), in that case the Supreme Court 
wrote that "instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly 
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion" 
constituted income.125 
Although H-S was not invoked by the Supreme Court in this 
famous articulation,126 H-S was likely in the air when Glenshaw 
Glass was decided.127  Certainly, the Court's statement, apart 
from its inclusion of the realization requirement, is consistent 
with H-S's emphasis on increases and outcomes.128  In addition, 
the realization requirement is treated by both Congress and the 
courts as a matter of administrative convenience and not as a 
constitutional requirement.129  As a result, "income" as a matter 
of general usage in both the Code and interpretive materials is 
consistent with the H-S principle.130 
The H-S principle is itself related to the idea that taxes 
should be determined based on a person's control over resources 
(ability-to-pay).131  Thus, H-S measures control during the 
                                                          
and sale "represented appreciation in the value of the capital assets of the estate which 
was not 'income'"). 
 124. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 125. Id. at 431. 
 126. See Dodge, Glenshaw Glass, supra note 122, at 36 ("[T]here is no evidence from 
the record that the Court and counsel were particularly aware of the Haig-Simons 
concept."). 
 127. See id. ("[I]t is significant that the reputation of Glenshaw . . . in the tax 
community grew in tandem with an increasing awareness of the Haig-Simons 
concept . . . ."). 
 128. See id. ("[I]t must be acknowledged that 'accession to wealth' sounds very much 
like 'increase in net wealth' . . . ."). 
 129. See Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) (citing Helvering v. 
Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940)) ("the concept of realization is 'founded on administrative 
convenience'").  Congress, for example, requires mark-to-market accounting (i.e., yearly 
valuation of assets) for securities dealers.  See I.R.C. § 475 (2006); see also Haig, supra 
note 3, at 62 (concluding that the realization requirement "is not in accord with economic 
facts" and stating "that certain so-called accounting principles have been evolved with 
other ends primarily in view than the accurate determination of relative taxpaying 
ability"). 
 130. See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 117, at 515 ("[T]here is a strong case for 
characterizing the current federal income tax as an SHS tax levy with targeted tax 
expenditures and concessions to administrative necessity, rather than as a hybrid 
income/consumption tax."). 
 131. See Haig, supra note 3, at 59 (explaining that an accretion model "defines 
income in terms of power to satisfy economic wants rather than in terms of the 
satisfactions themselves.  It has the effect of taxing the recipient of income when he 
receives the power to attain satisfactions rather than when he elects to exercise that 
power"); SIMONS, supra note 3, at 49 ("Personal income connotes, broadly, the exercise of 
control over the use of society's scarce resources."). 
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current tax period by analyzing the taxpayer's 
non-regenerative,132 personally beneficial133 use of resources 
during the tax period (consumption)134 and the change in the 
taxpayer's ability to use resources in the future (accumulation).135  
The value of both consumption and accumulation is determined 
objectively, with reference to their values in the market.136  It 
would theoretically be possible to measure value in utility terms, 
but such a system would be impossible to administer.137 
For example, imagine trying to administer a system in which 
Jane earns $100,000, spends $50,000 for a personal vacation, and 
                                                          
 The content and value of the ability-to-pay principle is itself the subject of an 
extensive literature.  The description in the main text grossly simplifies the concept in the 
interest of Article brevity.  For discussion of the ability-to-pay principle, as well as other 
fairness norms, see Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: 
Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 
399 (2005); Fleming & Peroni, supra note 117, at 450-60; Deborah A. Geier, Time to Bring 
Back the "Benefit" Norm?, 33 TAX NOTES INT'L 899 (2004); Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning 
the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual 
Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005); Richard A. Musgrave, 
Equity and the Case for Progressive Taxation, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 9, 
9-24 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002); C. Eugene Steuerle, And 
Equal (Tax) Justice for All?, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 253, 253-84 (Joseph J. 
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002). 
 132. See infra note 142 for a discussion of the selection of this term. 
 133. See Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 57 (suggesting that the "two terms, 
[consumption and personal benefit,] could even be interpreted as meaning the same 
thing"). 
 134. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 186-87 ("The term 'consumption' in 
the [H-S] definition covers all expenditures made except those incurred as costs in the 
earning or production of income.  Thus the term is not an independent concept . . . ."). 
 135. See SIMONS, supra note 3, at 49-50 ("Consumption as a quantity denotes the 
value of rights exercised in a certain way . . .; accumulation denotes the change in 
ownership of valuable rights as between the beginning and end of a period."). 
 136. See id. at 50 ("Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the 
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value . . . ."); 
Haig, supra note 3, at 56-59 (discussing why income must be calculated in terms of 
money, the "common, universally accepted unit of value"); see also Thuronyi, supra note 
114, at 50 ("[I]n defining income, Simons' principal concern was to propose objective, 
general rules as a bulwark against ad hoc exceptions that would erode the tax base in 
response to political whim."). 
 137. See Haig, supra note 3, at 57 ("If 'usances' and satisfactions are really the 
proper theoretical basis for apportioning the tax burden there is here an inequality.  
Certainly, everyone will agree that they constitute an entirely impracticable basis."); 
SIMONS, supra note 3, at 53 (explaining that it "would be the negation of measurement" if  
"income should be measured with regard for the relative pleasurableness of different 
activities"); see also Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 52-53 (discussing income concepts that 
would more expansively include 'well-being,' but concluding that "[i]f these elements were 
included, income would be a more meaningful measure, but would lose its practical 
usefulness"). 
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is permitted to argue for a $70,000 tax base because she 
experienced only a $20,000 well-being increase from the trip.138 
A central issue in applying H-S is to determine which 
outlays will reduce wealth without causing a simultaneous and 
commensurate increase to consumption;139 or, to put it another 
way, which outlays will reduce the tax base. 140  The term 
                                                          
 138. Far more contentious are situations involving in-kind receipts, imputed 
"income," and leisure.  If objectivity of measurement is viewed as an essential part of the 
H-S theory, the treatment of many of these issues becomes more obvious.  See Dodge, 
Glenshaw Glass, supra note 122, at 50 & n.124 (discussing the relationship of "theory" 
and "practice" as too difficult-to-measure in-kind consumption, explaining that theory 
requiring inclusion for in-kind consumption derives from the utilitarian tradition, and 
noting that "there is no more reason to 'swallow whole' a philosophy-derived theory of 
income than there is to do so with any other 'external-to-tax' theory"); Haig, supra note 3, 
at 57-58 (asking whether there is "any theoretical injustice" in measuring income through 
money rather than "'usances' and satisfactions" since "[w]ho . . . would seriously defend 
the proposition that taxes should be apportioned according to capacity for appreciation 
rather than according to the capacity to command the goods and services," and "[t]he only 
economically significant goods are those which are susceptible of evaluation in terms of 
money"); Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 52 (explaining that "the concept of utility has 
meaning only in the abstraction of economic theory" and "there is no way to measure 
levels of individual utility"); cf. Boris I. Bittker, A 'Comprehensive Tax Base' as a Goal of 
Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 932 (1967) [hereinafter Bittker, Comprehensive 
Tax Base] ("Such concessions [relating to realization and imputed income], in other words, 
are adjustments to practicality, rather than an integral part of the definition."); Mark. G. 
Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an 'Ideal' Income Tax and 
Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 880 (1979) ("I do 
not advocate a direct tax on ability to earn  . . . because I both recognize its administrative 
difficulties and think the tax system's respect for a taxpayer's refusal to treat potentially 
marketable resources as commodities represents a desirable anticapitalist strain in a 
market-obsessed culture.").  See generally Koppelman, supra note 3, at 699-700 (article 
that "attempt[s] to sketch the way in which income might serve as a measure of economic 
well-being"). 
 To the extent such items are more or less the same among socioeconomic classes and 
only vary significantly between classes, their direct tax treatment assumes less 
significance since other aspects of the tax system (e.g., tax rates) can be adjusted so that 
the system as a whole continues to operate along ability-to-pay lines.  See DODGE ET AL., 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 3, at 227 ("[B]enefits that might be statistically 
weighted in favor of one class or another . . . might better be taken into account in 
adjusting the tax rates . . . ."); SIMONS, supra note 3, at 52-53 ("[T]he neglect of 'earned 
income in kind' may be substantially offset, for comparative purposes (for measurement of 
relative incomes), if leisure income is also neglected.  For income taxation it is important 
that these elements of income vary with considerable regularity, from one income class to 
the next, along the income scale."); Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 49-50 (discussing the 
"general principle that the exclusion of a particular item from the definition of income is 
acceptable if the resulting distribution of the income tax burden would be considered 
equitable"). 
 139. See Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, supra note 113, at 212 ("[A]ll expenditures 
reduce the taxpayer's net worth, and hence presumptively are excluded from Haig-Simons 
'income.'  They are brought back into income, as so defined, only if they reflect 
'consumption' by the taxpayer."). 
 140. In their casebook, Professors Joseph Dodge, J. Clifton Fleming, and Deborah 
Geier distinguish between a "consumption-oriented approach" to H-S requiring (1) 
determining gross wealth, (2) subtracting all outlays, and (3) adding back in consumption 
outlays, and a "wealth-oriented approach" to H-S, which "treats the taxation of 
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"consumption" in early H-S accounts is frequently described in 
terms of resource "destruction."141  This term is arguably best 
viewed as one phrasing of a well-established H-S implementation 
standard: in order for an outlay to reduce the tax base, it must 
occur in the context of a regenerative activity.142  In other words, 
the cost must be incurred to facilitate at least enough income 
production to restore the taxpayer to its economic position prior 
to incurrence of the cost.143  Outlays that do not occur in such a 
context represent "destructive" consumption and must be 
                                                          
consumption as a principle of non-deductibility."  See DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX, supra note 3, at 224-25.  The Code shows traces of both versions.  See Dodge, 
Glenshaw Glass, supra note 122, at 50 (discussing "ambivalence" in Code and regulations 
regarding H-S implementation).  This Article's articulation of H-S is focused on the 
principle of non-deductibility (or non-exclusion) since this is more likely to be a central 
issue in a tax-avoidance scheme.  Cf. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 3, 
at 225 (noting that in "actual practice the tax base is calculated mostly according to the 
wealth-oriented approach"). 
 141. See SIMONS, supra note 3, at 49-50 ("Consumption . . . denotes the value of 
rights exercised in a certain way (in destruction of economic goods) . . . ."); see also 
Koppelman, supra note 3, at 686 ("Contemporary discussions of personal deductions often 
implicitly adopt the destruction of economic goods requirement."). 
 142. See SIMONS, supra note 3, at 54 ("[A]ccumulation or investment provides a basis 
for expense deductions in the future, while consumption does not."); Koppelman, supra 
note 3, at 706 ("All voluntary expenditures unrelated to a profit-seeking activity should be 
considered taxable consumption under an income tax based upon power to consume. 
Whether economic goods are destroyed is irrelevant under this concept."). 
 Some might quibble that the term "regenerative" is too low a threshold since the 
term implies that outlays aimed only at producing enough income to cover such outlays 
should reduce the tax base.  This term is, however, consistent with a pragmatic approach 
to H-S and is supported by practice in the Code.  For example, in the case of gray area 
activities, deductions are generally allowed up to the amount of income (after certain 
adjustments) generated by the activity.  See I.R.C. § 183 (2006) (providing for hobby 
losses); I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5) (2006) (addressing home office expenses); cf. I.R.C. § 163(d) 
(2006) (detailing investment interest deduction limitations); I.R.C. § 469 (2006) 
(describing passive activity loss deduction limitations). 
 More would argue that this threshold is too high.  For example, various writers add 
that certain involuntary costs are also deductible under H-S.  See generally Deborah A. 
Geier, The Taxation of Income Available for Discretionary Use, 25 VA. TAX REV. 765 (2006) 
(arguing for additional distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary spending); 
Koppelman, supra note 3, at 682 ("[N]ot all items unrelated to profit-seeking activities 
should be denied a deduction . . . . Items which frustrate the power to consume, such as a 
lost paycheck, should be deductible.").  This aspect of H-S is omitted from the main text 
since the categorization of involuntary costs is of little (if any) relevance to the proposed 
application of H-S to the ESD.  Another line of argument asserts that consideration 
should be given to distinguishing between preclusive and non-preclusive use, which is 
close to requiring actual destruction in order for something to constitute consumption.  
See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
309, 314-15 ("A good argument can be made that taxable personal consumption should be 
defined to include divisible, private goods and services whose consumption by one 
household precludes enjoyment by others, but not collective goods whose enjoyment is 
nonpreclusive . . . ."). 
 143. See supra note 142. 
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included in the tax base.144  To return to the example of Jane 
above, assume that instead of winning an award show, Jane 
earned $100,000 as a tax consultant and she incurred $50,000 in 
various overhead expenses all reasonably related to earning the 
$100,000.  Since Jane incurs the $50,000 outlay in order to 
facilitate the generation of business income, her H-S tax base will 
only be $50,000—the $50,000 increase in wealth from the prior 
year plus $0 in "consumption."  In other words, Jane earns 
$100,000 and receives a $50,000 deduction for her business 
expenses. 
The regenerative activity requirement is more commonly 
stated as a requirement that, in order to be deductible, costs 
must have been incurred to further a business investment or 
other "for profit" activity.145  This determination depends 
principally on taxpayer intent, which will be difficult to discern 
under the best of circumstances.146  In addition, many cost 
outlays improve a person's capacity for generating future income, 
but without bearing a close relationship to the production of that 
income—the cost of meals being an obvious example.  Without 
nexus requirements, individuals could quickly advance theories 
for assigning most (if not all) outlays to a "for profit" motive.147 
To prevent erosion of the tax base and to minimize the 
difficulty of determining intent, implementation of the H-S 
principle requires adoption of standards and rules.148  For 
example, the Code adopts the standard that business and 
investment expenses must be "ordinary and necessary" to be 
deductible.149  Of course, such standards are by their nature 
                                                          
 144. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Koppelman, supra note 3, at 680-81 ("All agree that expenditures for 
personal items . . . should not be deductible if unrelated to a profit-seeking activity.").  
This is also reflected in the Code.  See I.R.C. § 212 (deduction for ordinary and necessary 
expenses incurred "for the production or collection of income"). 
 146. See SIMONS, supra note 3, at 54-55 ("[O]ften the motives will be quite mixed."). 
 147. See Goode, supra note 122, at 15 (explaining that a large portion of 
"consumption" is "necessary in order to sustain an efficient labor force" and separating 
ultimate consumption from "necessary" consumption raises "philosophical questions" that 
are impossible to answer). 
 148. See Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base, supra note 138, at 985 ("The central 
source of difficulty is the fact that the income tax structure cannot be discovered, but 
must be constructed; it is the final result of a multitude of debatable judgments."); Goode, 
supra note 122, at 15 (explaining that separating consumption from deductible outlays 
"depends on the intention of the spender, supplemented in practice by rules based partly 
on custom but with arbitrary elements"); cf. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 5 
(explaining that the H-S "definition covers only basis aspects and a few details" and that 
the "construction of a tax expenditure budget therefore requires an extension of the [H-S] 
analysis to many issues that have arisen since its initial explication"). 
 149. See I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 212(1)-(2).  The recent health care legislation added 
sentences and subsections to Code section 162.  See Patient Protection and Affordable 
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imprecise, and Congress or the Department of the Treasury 
frequently specify ex ante rules to supplement the standards.150 
The further H-S descends into nitty-gritty reality, the more 
likely it becomes that rules will predominate and grow 
increasingly complex.151  Correspondingly, the necessity of 
relying on rough justice becomes more apparent,152 and the 
possibility of multiple "right" approaches to implementing H-S 
increases (as do disputes over which approach most correctly 
interprets H-S).153 
                                                          
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 9014(a), 10108(g)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 868-69, 913 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (2010)).  For example, section 
10108(g)(1) adds a new sentence to § 162(a) and section 9014(a) adds § 162(m)(6) for 
health insurance providers.  See id.  Litigation is underway regarding the 
constitutionality of the healthcare reform legislation.  See, e.g., Florida ex. rel Bondie v. 
United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 
285683, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  This litigation does not affect this Article's use of 
section 162, nor should the healthcare litigation affect this Article's discussion of Code 
section 7701(o).  Even though Code § 7701(o) was added by the healthcare legislation, the 
codification of economic substance doctrine is unrelated to the health care provisions 
whose constitutionality has been challenged. 
 150. See generally David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to 
Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1999) (describing the trend of ex 
ante legislation evaluation). 
 151. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 183 (hobby loss provision); I.R.C. § 274 (limitations on 
deductibility for travel and entertainment costs). 
 152. The difficulty of resolving the gray area between business and personal 
consumption was well understood by Henry Simons.  See SIMONS, supra note 3, at 54-55 
("[H]ere one finds inescapable the unwelcome criterion of intention.  A thoroughly precise 
and objective distinction is inconceivable.  Given items will represent business expense in 
one instance and merely consumption in another, and often the motives will be quite 
mixed.  A commercial artist buys paints and brushes to use in making his living.  Another 
person may buy the same articles as playthings for his children, or to cultivate a hobby of 
his own.  Even the professional artist may use some of his materials for things he intends 
or hopes to sell, and some on work done purely for his own pleasure.  In another instance, 
moreover, the same items may represent investment in training for earning activity later 
on.  The latter instance suggests that there is something quite arbitrary even about the 
distinction between consumption and accumulation . . . .  The distinction in question can 
be made somewhat definite if one adopts the drastic expedient of treating all outlays for 
augmenting personal earning capacity as consumption.  This expedient has little more 
than empty, formal, legalistic justification.  On the other hand, one does well to accept, 
here as elsewhere, a loss of relevance or adequacy as the necessary cost of an essential 
definiteness."). 
 153. Compare SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 164 ("The standards used to 
determine an income tax should also recognize that there can be differing responses to 
particular questions and that each of those responses can constitute part of a normative 
tax."), with Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, supra note 113, at 203 ("There is, 
unfortunately, no theoretically satisfactory boundary between business expenses that 
provide incidental personal benefits and personal expenditures that incidentally serve 
business purposes."), and Kelman, supra note 138, at 876-77 (describing how "[t]he tax 
literature addressing the business expense has posed a number of solutions to the 
problem of the mixture of consumption and nonconsumption elements in one 
expenditure . . . [b]ut none of these approaches bears much scrutiny"), and Musgrave, 
supra note 117, at 57 (describing the boundary between personal and business expenses 
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Even if a cost outlay is sufficiently related to a "for profit" 
activity, a current reduction to the tax base will not necessarily 
be proper.  An outlay is not currently deductible if the taxpayer 
merely transforms one resource into another resource whose 
useful life will extend beyond the tax period.154  To put it in more 
formal H-S terms, a cost outlay will not reduce wealth if the 
outlay merely transforms one type of wealth into another.155  Of 
course, this raises complicated tracing and valuation issues.156  
To again return to Jane, assume that she earned $100,000 as a 
consultant and she spent $50,000 to purchase a small building 
for her business.  In that situation, her H-S tax base would 
remain $100,000—a $50,000 increase in cash wealth over the 
preceding year plus a $50,000 increase in asset wealth (plus $0 in 
"consumption").  More conventionally stated, Jane includes 
$100,000 as income and receives a $50,000 tax basis157 in the 
office building.  As will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section, determining the length of the tax period is critical in 
distinguishing outlays that may currently reduce the tax base 
from those that must be capitalized (that is, give rise to basis). 
B. Of Departures, Gaps, and Ambiguities 
Most tax scholars and policymakers continue to write and 
legislate under the assumptions that asking H-S questions 
remains important and that answers to such questions are 
                                                          
as "an area where reference to an income concept is needed . . . [and] is helpful because it 
tells us that consumption is part of accretion"). 
 154. The proposed H-S ESD requires that deductions be supported by actual declines 
in wealth.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 155. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 156. See Fellows, supra note 119, 738-40 (describing how market price may be 
different for seller and buyer even in fairly routine transactions).  In addition, various tax 
rules intentionally depart from the standard that amounts spent on items with value 
extending into the next period should not be currently deductible.  See infra note 184 
(discussing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992)).  Deductions for business 
advertising and routine employee training expenses are the most obvious examples.  See 
J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 288-89, 293 (8th 
ed. 2007) (describing issues surrounding deductibility of employee training and 
advertising).  Even though advertising and employee training provide some long-term 
benefits, from an administrative standpoint it is arguably appropriate to allow current 
deductibility since allocation of the benefit to a particular period will be administratively 
difficult.  See id.  Well-accepted deductions for similar difficult-to-allocate business costs 
seem unlikely to be used to fuel a tax shelter. 
 157. The term "basis" is used to indicate an amount that will not be subjected to 
further tax.  For example, if Jane sells the building for $60,000, she will pay taxes on only 
$10,000 since she already included the $50,000 she used to purchase the building in her 
income. 
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reasonably ascertainable.158  Thus, a significant portion of H-S 
scholarship deals with definitional problems at the margins;159 
that is, it analyzes whether particular items should or should not 
be included in the tax base.160  These definitional discussions can 
be roughly grouped into three categories: (1) some commentators 
                                                          
 158. See Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 46 ("Despite  . . . theoretical objections, the 
[H-S] term . . . is commonly employed as if it were a relatively well-defined or 
well-understood concept."). 
 159. See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 117, at 453 (describing the same phenomenon 
with respect to the ability-to-pay concept, which is closely aligned with H-S). 
 160. Much of this discussion has revolved around the formulation of the tax 
expenditure budget rather than expressly about H-S.  The Congressional Budget Act of 
1974 requires an annual tax expenditure budget to be prepared (1) by the Congressional 
Budget Office, which has delegated its responsibility to the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
and (2) by the President, who has delegated that responsibility to the Treasury.  See 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 202(f)(1), 601, 88 Stat. 297, 304, 
323-24 (1974) (enacting legislation); Joint Committee on Taxation, A Reconsideration of 
Tax Expenditure Analysis (JCX-37-08), May 12, 2008, available at www.house.gov/jct 
[hereinafter Joint Committee on Taxation] (describing process); STANLEY S. SURREY, 
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 1-14, (HARV. UNIV. 
PRESS 1973) (describing background of the tax expenditure budget); SURREY & MCDANIEL, 
supra note 31, at 1-30 (describing the tax expenditure concept); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., 
Taxing Tax Expenditures?, 130 TAX NOTES 775 (2011) (discussing history, critiques, and 
benefits of tax expenditure analysis).  The tax expenditure budget requires analysis of 
deviations from a "normal" tax baseline.  It is widely recognized that this "normal" 
baseline is dependent on H-S, with some deviations in order to deal with silences on 
structural issues and account for standard departures from H-S (e.g., realization).  See 
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra, at 12-14 (explaining that the tax expenditure 
budget and related analysis "dr[a]w importantly on the general acceptance of the 
Haig-Simons approach to the definition of 'income'" but describing how some H-S 
departures were necessary in formulating the budget); Joint Committee on Taxation, 
supra, at 7, 19. 
 Stanley Surrey is widely recognized as the motivating force behind the budget.  His 
hope was that requiring this additional deliberative process would lead to a reduction of 
government inefficiencies and the formulation of criteria for selecting between direct and 
indirect subsidies.  See Joint Committee on Taxation, supra, at 2-3 ("Surrey hoped that, 
by rephrasing "tax incentive" proposals as "tax expenditures," and then by analyzing 
equity, efficiency and administrative consequences of those proposals as if they were 
spending requests, policymakers would recognize that many such proposals were 
inconsistent with the goal of a fair, efficient and simple income tax system.").  See 
generally Paul R. McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Expenditures: How to Identify Them; 
How to Control Them, 15 TAX NOTES 595 (1982) (examining tax expenditure identification 
issues and explaining the need for measures to control tax expenditures).  Within the last 
few years, the Joint Committee on Taxation has attempted to distance itself from Surrey 
as part of a process to re-invigorate the tax expenditure budget process.  See Joint 
Committee on Taxation, supra; Edward D. Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on 
Taxation, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, Address at the Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Federal Tax Institute (May 1, 2008) (explaining the Joint Committee on Taxation is 
reexamining tax expenditure analysis in response to the criticisms against it and to make 
it more useful to policymakers).  Review of the tax expenditure budget debate is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  As to the impact of this debate on the importance of H-S, even 
the Joint Committee on Taxation notes, "[W]e recognize that our specific implementation 
of tax expenditure analysis is firmly wedded to the view that the current Internal 
Revenue code is at heart an income tax . . . ."  Joint Committee on Taxation, supra, at 16.  
This seems to represent a concession that H-S is still alive and well. 
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work to find ways to reconcile a current or desired practice with 
H-S—whether through adjusting the practice or a particular 
interpretation of H-S; (2) similarly, others argue for strict 
adherence and propose methods for achieving that goal; and (3) 
finally, some argue that a particular item would likely be taxed 
under strict adherence to H-S but that some other policy goal 
supports a departure from H-S. 161  Each category will have its 
proponents, but no readily stated constraint prevents a 
particular commentator from shifting to a different type of 
response when a different item is at issue. 
This apparent freedom to move easily from one type of 
response to another depending on the type (and popularity) of the 
detail at issue may help explain assertions that H-S is overly 
ambiguous and its application too subjective.162  Various writers 
                                                          
 161. See Haig, supra note 3, at 69 ("Those who are convinced that taxation should be 
used for the furtherance of social ends often demand special modifications."). 
 To give one example of how these approaches play out with respect to a particular 
item, consider the deduction for charitable contributions.  Should the deduction for 
charitable contributions be retained because, through careful interpretation of H-S, the 
deduction is proper under H-S; abolished because charitable contributions are 
indistinguishable from other items of personal consumption; or preserved even if the 
contributions represent personal consumption because the deduction furthers other 
important policy goals?  See Andrews, supra note 142 (arguing for definition of personal 
consumption that would exclude charitable contributions from the tax base); Boris I. 
Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 
37, 37 (1972) (discussing "the propriety and vitality of the federal income tax deduction 
for contributions to private charitable organizations"); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for A 
Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1394, 1396-1433 (1988) 
(examining three theories advanced to support the deduction); Kelman, supra note 138, at 
834 (seeking "to demonstrate that Professor Andrews's notion of private preclusive 
appropriation is unconvincing, and in any event would not logically justify the charitable 
deduction"); Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 57 (suggesting that the charitable contribution 
deduction might be disallowed because making contributions confers a personal benefit 
even if "a charitable contribution arguably does not constitute personal consumption"); cf. 
Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for 
the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 378 (1971) (proposing that "we should 
substitute for the charitable contribution deduction a system of direct federal assistance 
for private charitable organizations through a matching grant mechanism"). 
 Again, these debates often play out in the context of the tax expenditure budget.  See 
Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 160, at 1 (asserting that the tax expenditure 
budget has been "[d]riven off track by seemingly endless debates about what should and 
should not be included in the 'normal' tax base . . ."). 
 162. In recent years, the Joint Committee on Taxation has taken the position that 
traditional tax expenditure analysis must be changed because of its over-reliance on the 
"normal" (H-S) tax. See Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 160, at 1.  It based this 
conclusion on various critiques of the notion of a "normal" (again, read H-S) tax. See id. at 
1 ("The JCT Staff therefore has begun a project to rethink how to best articulate the 
principles of tax expenditure analysis, in order to . . . address the concerns raised by many 
commentators.").  The report, for example, asserts that "the 'normal' tax is . . . not a 
rigorous tax framework developed from first principles" and that "[a]s a result, the 
'normal' tax cannot be defended from criticism as a series of ultimately idiosyncratic or 
pragmatic choices."  Id. at 7. 
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have addressed the question of whether H-S is an intelligible 
principle, many by arguing that larger economic or justice 
principles can be used to (or already do) provide meaningful 
constraints on the subjectivity of the H-S concept.163 
As the introduction to this Part already implied, this Article 
takes as a working assumption that H-S has sufficiently agreed 
upon content to be of normative value in spite of some 
subjectivity of interpretation.164 
Three interrelated, additional criticisms of H-S are of more 
direct concern to the proposed project of using H-S to determine 
the tax consequences of a tax-avoidance transaction.  First, the 
Code and interpretive administrative authorities intentionally 
depart from H-S in numerous areas, often in order to advance 
other policy goals.165  Second, even assuming Congress intended 
to implement H-S as fully as possible, as a result of practical 
limitations, some departures would almost certainly remain.166  
Finally, even if all practical limitations could be overcome, H-S 
does not address various structural issues, which are essential 
components of a tax system.167  Since tax shelters so frequently 
utilize such departures and gaps as their source material, these 
three concerns regarding implementation of H-S have particular 
relevance to this Article's proposal.  The response to each is 
somewhat different. 
As to whether intentional legislative departures present a 
serious obstacle depends on preliminary court determinations 
regarding legislative intent.  To illustrate, consider a technique 
                                                          
 163. See Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 47 ("An adequate groundwork for the income 
concept . . . can be provided by basing it on tax fairness."). 
 164. See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 117, at 458 (The H-S "definition does provide 
a principled structure that is useful for testing the efficacy of tax provisions and opposing 
bad tax policy."); Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 63 (analogizing H-S to the concept of 
"poverty" and noting that the "arbitrariness and subjectivity of the concept do not—and 
should not—prevent it from being used, since without this concept it would be difficult to 
get a handle on some important social problems"). 
 165. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 395  (noting that tax system "contains provisions 
expressly designed to alter taxpayers' behavior"); McMahon, Economic Substance, supra 
note 37, at 1019 (noting "that the code abounds with provisions that not only influence 
economic behavior, but which are intended to influence economic behavior"). 
 166. Cf. Haig, supra note 3, at 68 ("A lively regard for the limitations of the 
administration is essential to the successful formulation of a tax statute."). 
 167. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 187-88 (discussing various 
limitations of the H-S definition); Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 160, at 19 ("As 
numerous critics have pointed out, the Haig-Simons definition says nothing about most 
structural issues that must be decided under any income tax law, such as the rate 
structure, the proper taxpaying unit and the proper accounting period."); Koppelman, 
supra note 3, at 685 & n.21 (explaining that H-S is silent as to personal deductions, "the 
nature of the taxable unit . . ., the rate structure, and the taxation of foreign 
transactions"). 
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that uses a Code provision for accelerated depreciation as the 
engine for reducing taxes and that a court must decide whether 
to respect the taxpayer's position.  A court's findings include the 
possibilities that: (1) legislative intent requires that the structure 
of the transaction and depreciation deductions be respected; (2) 
legislative intent requires that the depreciation be preserved but 
the transaction be re-cast to allocate the depreciation differently 
(e.g., to the "true owner"); or (3) legislative intent requires that 
the transaction be treated as a substantive sham and the claimed 
depreciation be denied in its entirety.168  As discussed in Parts 
II.A & E, current use of the ESD corresponds with the third 
possibility. 
In contrast, under the proposed H-S ESD, a court would 
decide ultimate tax consequences only after determining either 
that legislative intent requires the depreciation deduction be 
denied or that legislative intent with respect to the taxpayer's 
use of the depreciation deduction is ambiguous.169  The proposed 
H-S ESD thus moves from disregarding a transaction to taxing 
the transaction using H-S.170  Use of the H-S ESD would, 
however, necessitate a preliminary legislative intent 
determination with respect to the tax rules at issue in a 
particular case.171  In light of Glenshaw Glass and its progeny, a 
plausible argument can be made that H-S already functions as a 
background presumption in the event of legislative ambiguity 
about the income tax base,172 and H-S is thus a reasonable choice 
to guide the taxation of tax-avoidance techniques. 
The second two criticisms – that H-S implementation may be 
administratively impossible in some areas and that H-S is silent 
as to important structural issues – cannot be addressed through 
an appeal to legislative intent. In determining the tax 
consequences of a tax shelters, three areas of administrative 
difficulty or structural silence stand out as particularly 
problematic: (1) questions of timing, (2) problems of taxpayer 
unit, and (3) concerns relating to international tax.173  As will be 
                                                          
 168. See discussion supra Part II.E. 
 169. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 170. See infra note 404 and accompanying text. 
 171. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 172. Cf. Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 101 ("Given the extent of the internal 
inconsistency of our income tax statute, it would be impossible for Congress to instruct 
the courts to construe the statute according to any general principles."). 
 173. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1-3.  This is not intended to be an exhaustive 
list.  Character conversion, for example, is a frequent tax reduction strategy, but H-S does 
not address issues of tax rate.  See Charlene D. Luke, Beating the "Wrap": The Agency 
Effort to Control Wraparound Insurance Tax Shelters, 25 VA. TAX REV. 129, 131-32 (2005) 
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discussed in the context of the case studies, under the proposed 
H-S ESD, a court could draw on long-standing solutions to H-S 
discontinuities to tax a suspect transaction.174  The difficulty in 
resolving such H-S discontinuities would, however, serve as a 
signal that the H-S ESD may not, after all, have been the best 
tool for analyzing the transaction.175 
1. Timing 
Tax-reduction techniques may unfold over multiple years or 
may depend on gaming the realization requirement.176  As 
discussed in Part II, since a transaction's failure under the ESD 
results in the court disregarding the taxpayer's claimed tax 
consequences, under current law, a court has little need to 
determine how to deal with timing elements of a transaction.  
Timing could, however, be an issue under the proposed H-S ESD, 
since, as will be described in Part IV, the change in wealth 
actually generated by the transaction is calculated. 
Pure H-S arguably requires continuous accretion177 (i.e., tax 
periods of infinitesimal length178)— an administrative 
                                                          
[hereinafter Luke, Beating the "Wrap"] (describing use of variable insurance products to 
convert ordinary income to income taxed at a lower rate). 
 174. See infra notes 405-07 and accompanying text. 
 175. See discussion infra Part V. 
 176. The straddle cases of the late 1970s, for example, depended on closing the loss 
"leg" of the straddle in the year before closing the gain leg.  See, e.g., Glass v. Comm'r, 87 
T.C. 1087, 1106 (1986).  I.R.C. § 1092 (2006) was enacted to halt these types of straddles.  
See James N. Calvin et al., Examining the Straddle Rules After 25 Years, 125 TAX NOTES 
1301 (2009); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., An Examination of the Effect of Recent Legislation 
on Commodity Tax Straddles, 2 VA. TAX REV. 165, 166 (1983); Deborah H. Schenk, 
Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 571, 610 
(1995). 
 177. The importance of limiting tax deferral was likely less well understood at the 
time Simons wrote, and he seems not to have given it serious thought.  See Bittker, 
Comprehensive Tax Base, supra note 138, at 958-59 & n.59 (describing Simons' failure to 
appreciate the problem of timing); Fellows, supra note 119, at 724 ("Simons was generally 
indifferent to the timing implications of his definition."); Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 65 
("It appears that Simons believed that the specification of the taxable period was not of 
great importance.  This attitude is consistent with Simons' general approach of 
downplaying the importance of tax deferral."). 
 Thus, an alternative view is that H-S is simply silent as to the length of the tax 
period.  Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base, supra note 138, at 958 ("The Simons definition 
of income does not specify the period of time to which it is to be applied: that is left to the 
person who uses the definition . . . ."); SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 188 ("The 
S-H-S definition does not specify the period to be used in calculating income.").  Since 
continuous accretion is impossible to administer, the practical difference between the two 
views is minimal. 
 178. See Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 65 ("[I]n terms of the Haig-Simons 
formulation, the term 'period' should be taken as referring to an infinitesimal length of 
time."). 
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impossibility.179  Historically, the tax period has been one year.180  
But even as to that one year period, wealth changes caused by 
asset value fluctuation are generally not recognized in the tax 
system until there has been a realization event, such as a sale or 
exchange.181  Common justifications for the realization 
requirement include the need for an administrable system and 
concern about taxpayer liquidity.182 
A large literature has developed surrounding the realization 
requirement and its relationship to H-S.183  If timing were an 
issue in applying the H-S ESD, a court could tax a transaction by 
drawing on this literature.  First, if possible, end-of-tax-year 
valuation would be required184 (annual rather than continuous 
since one year is the generally applicable tax period).185  The 
rationales for maintaining the realization requirement have 
significantly less force with respect to the sophisticated parties 
likely to be involved in abusive tax schemes.  Second, even if an 
asset is legitimately impossible to value, a possible next-best 
solution would be to impute a minimum return.186  Of course, the 
                                                          
 179. See Musgrave, supra note 117, at 59 ("[I]t is not feasible to define concurrent on 
an 'every minute' basis."). 
 180. Cf. Haig, supra note 3, at 63-64 (Accounting periods of "true economic length" 
are "in the case of the wage earner . . . a week and the salaried worker a month.  In the 
typical business the period is, of course, a year . . . ."). 
 181. See id. at 65 ("For example, one might urge that no tax be placed on a gain 
arising from the appreciation of a fixed asset until it is actually sold."). 
 182. See Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: 
A "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 742-43 (1992) (discussing 
the "concerns" that led to the development of the realization requirement). 
 183. See generally David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, 
Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX. L. REV. 731 
(1995); Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 182; Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: 
Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and The Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997). 
 184. Cf. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 88, 90 (1992) (concluding that the 
litigated "transaction produced significant benefits . . . that extended beyond the tax year 
in question" and costs had to be capitalized).  Whether the benefit obtained from a cost 
outlay extends beyond the taxable year has been the historical benchmark used to 
determine deductibility.  See id. 
 185. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.  It should be noted that the "taxable 
year" aspect of this requirement has been changing over to a 12-month rule in certain 
areas.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(1) (2009) ("12- month rule" for certain 
intangibles); Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related 
to Tangible Property, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,838, 12,848 (proposed Mar. 10, 2008) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (defining "materials and supplies" to include a property unit with "an 
economic useful life of 12 months or less"). 
 186. See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 182, at 733 (proposing the imputation of 
a minimum rate of return on capital in various circumstances).  Under Cunningham and 
Schenk's proposal, basis would be increased by the minimum return so that any necessary 
adjustments would automatically occur at realization.  Id. at 733-37.  For other similar 
proposals see Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 
167 (1991) (proposing retention of the realization requirement but a retroactive 
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necessity of crafting such solutions highlights a central difficulty 
of attempting the importation of H-S into the tax shelter area, 
and even if such solutions were adopted, new forms of taxpayer 
manipulations could arise. 
2. Taxpayer Unit 
It is reasonably well accepted that the tax unit under H-S is 
the individual.187  Individuals, however, frequently act in groups, 
such as families and businesses.  Tax shelters often utilize 
corporations and partnerships or are entered into by corporations 
and partnerships.  As a result, any effort to apply H-S in the tax 
shelter arena must account for any H-S limitations relating to 
taxpayer identity. 
An obvious limitation, and one that may at first seem 
insuperable, is that the corporate tax does not and cannot 
conform to H-S.188  In practice, however, H-S standards and rules 
are applied all of the time to business entities.189  Calculation of 
                                                          
imputation of a risk-free rate of return); Fellows, supra note 119 (proposing a 
time-adjusted-realization-event tax); Charlene D. Luke, Taxing Risk: An Approach to 
Variable Insurance Reform, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 247, 281-87 (2007) (proposing current 
taxation of cash value life insurance inside buildup other than an amount representing 
the risk-free rate of return). 
 187. See Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 69 (explaining that the taxable unit is 
generally thought of the individual and that Simons apparently "thought of the taxable 
unit as the individual and not the family" because he "refer[red] to the income of 'a 
person'").  But see Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base, supra note 138, at 974 (concluding 
that the "the concept of a CTB [comprehensive tax base] is quite independent of the choice 
of taxpaying units"); Koppelman, supra note 3, at 695 n.86 ("Simons does not address the 
question of the proper taxable unit."). 
 188. See Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 77-79 ("On a balance sheet, corporate assets 
are always offset by liabilities . . . . The net worth of a corporation in this sense is always 
zero; therefore, a corporation can never experience an increase in its net worth and cannot 
have income in the Haig-Simons sense."); see also Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base, supra 
note 138, at 979-80 (explaining that the comprehensive tax base concept fails to provide 
guidance as to the corporate income tax); cf. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 
160, at 19 (explaining that "strong arguments could be made that integrated taxation of 
corporations and shareholders would better implement the Haig-Simons definition"); 
Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to New Corporate Income Tax Advocacy, 2008 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 591, 591-92 (2008) ("The corporate income tax has long been considered 
unjustifiable on traditional tax policy grounds."). 
 189. The tax expenditure budget has historically (and controversially) included 
corporate tax items.  See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 117, at 506 ("[T]he considerably 
imperfect corporate income tax is all that prevents the C corporation business form from 
being utilized as a massive tax deferral machine and the corporate income tax can fill its 
anti-deferral role effectively only if its base is substantially inclusive of all items that 
should be income if earned directly by individual shareholders."); SURREY & MCDANIEL, 
supra note 31, at 215 ("Both the full integration approach and the classical separate 
approach are acceptable as national policies.  Tax theory does not posit either as 
normative.  But once a policy decision has been made for either approach, it is possible to 
identify tax expenditures."); cf. Thuronyi, supra note 114, at 78 (stating that "[i]t is not 
uncommon to find reference to the Haig-Simons income of corporations," and that "income 
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the corporate tax base, for example, is made in terms of wealth 
changes, measured through allowance or denial of certain 
exclusions or deductions.190  Denial of a deduction for "personal" 
consumption outlays obviously makes no sense in terms of a 
corporation, and a corporation's "personal" consumption will 
necessarily be zero.  Although that is the case, requirements like 
the "ordinary and necessary" clause of Code section 162 recognize 
that businesses can be used for non-business reasons by the 
individuals acting in different agency relationships to the 
business.191 
A second issue emerges in the partnership area.  A 
partnership is an accounting entity but is not a tax entity.192  
That is, the partners are responsible for the tax items generated 
by the partnership.193  As a result, unlike the corporate tax, the 
taxation of partnership income is not incompatible with H-S.  On 
the other hand, H-S provides little guidance as to how the tax 
burden should be allocated when income is attributable to a 
group effort.194  The judicially enunciated "owner/earner pays" 
                                                          
is a disembodied concept that can be applied to corporations in the same manner as to 
individuals"). 
 190. See E. Cary Brown & Jeremy I. Bulow, The Definition of Taxable Business 
Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 241, 243 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977) 
("[A]pplying the Haig-Simons definition of income to the business firm means that income 
will consist of accrued changes in net worth, plus distributions and less net contributions 
of capital."). 
 191. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006); Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, supra note 113, at 
203-04 (discussing the problem of wasteful business expenses because the decision 
whether to be expansive or to economize is frequently affected by personal values). 
Generally, even if an outlay is not currently deductible because it is not "ordinary and 
necessary," it is capitalized (i.e., added to basis).  See Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 
(1966) ("[C]apital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the 
useful life of the asset.").  But often any benefit from such capitalization will not be 
available, if ever, for many years.  See id. ("The principal function of the term 
'ordinary' . . . is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are 
currently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital expenditures . . . ."). 
 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), is the most well-known case interpreting the 
"ordinary and necessary" test of Code section 162.  See generally Joel S. Newman, The 
Story of Welch: The Use (and Misuse) of the 'Ordinary and Necessary' Test for Deducting 
Business Expenses, in TAX STORIES 197 (Paul Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009) (discussing Welch's 
impact in defining ordinary and necessary business expenses).  It has been used both to 
mandate capitalization but also to deny tax benefits business outlays that are overly 
"bizarre" or representative of the "personal predilections" of agents of the business.  Id. at 
221.  In Welch, a taxpayer paid off debts that had already been discharged in bankruptcy 
and that belonged to a defunct corporation for which the taxpayer had been an officer.  
See Welch, 290 U.S. at 112.  The taxpayer paid these debts "[i]n order to re-establish his 
relations with customers whom he had known when acting for the Welch Company and to 
solidify his credit and standing . . . ."  Id. 
 192. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 215. 
 193. Cf. id. 
 194. See  Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 160, at 19 ("As numerous critics 
have pointed out, the Haig-Simons definition says nothing about most structural issues 
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standard is consistent with H-S,195 but determining ownership or 
earner status in a joint enterprise is no simple task and is not 
addressed by H-S.196  Once, however, the economic income earned 
by a partnership is divvied up among the partners, the 
owner/earner standard could be used to require that the 
partners' tax consequences follow the partners' economic 
allocations.197 
3. International Tax 
Various aspects of international tax are relevant to the 
problem of tax shelters.  This section briefly considers two areas 
in H-S terms: deferral of the income of foreign subsidiaries and 
the foreign tax credit. 198 
U.S. businesses may (and frequently do) establish foreign 
subsidiaries.  The income generated by such subsidiaries is 
generally not subject to U.S. tax until it is repatriated to the 
U.S.199  Deferral is, of course, generally inconsistent with the H-S 
principle. 200  But, as discussed above, H-S does not address 
taxpayer identity, and, generally, the separate entity status of a 
                                                          
that must be decided under any income tax law, such as . . . the proper taxpaying 
unit . . . ."). 
 195. Under this line of cases, an individual is taxed on the income he earns and may 
not avoid paying tax on it through assignment.  See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 
(1930) (finding that the owner of the income could not escape an income tax through an 
"arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which 
they grew"); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119-20 (1940) (applying Lucas's fruit and 
tree analogy to interest earned from negotiable bonds); Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 
433-36 (2005) (holding that "when a litigant's recovery constitutes income, the litigant's 
income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee"). 
 196. See Bradley T. Borden, Taxing Shared Economies of Scale, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 
721, 730-33, 766-70 (2009) (discussing use of economic theory to determine when 
Subchapter K is necessary to determine the taxation of individuals). 
 197. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 191 ("[A] series of normative rules 
must be provided to relate the partnership accounts and activities to those of the partners 
in order to determine the treatment of the partners.  Although the task is a difficult one, 
it is within the realm of the development of normative tax rules."). The tax law ensures 
that tax consequences follow economic consequences primarily by requiring the 
maintenance of partnership capital accounts and mandating that these accounts control 
benefits and burdens at liquidation.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (2008). 
 198. See generally SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 166 ("The 
Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income is the basic element used to structure taxation 
of a country's own taxpayers, but it does not specify which foreigners should be subject to 
the income tax and, if they are subject to tax, how they are to be taxed. The 
Schanz-Haig-Simons definition does not concern itself with source rules."). 
 199. See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 117, at 529.  Code section 965 was a recent 
attempt by Congress to persuade businesses to repatriate by lowering the tax rate for 
such income.  See I.R.C. § 965 (2006). 
 200. See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 117, at 532 (stating that "deferral undercuts 
the anti-deferral function of the corporate tax system and, thus, is a departure from the 
corporate income tax baseline"). 
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foreign subsidiary would have to be set aside in order for the 
U.S.to tax its income.201  There are good arguments to be made 
for doing so, but the possible mechanisms (e.g., assignment of 
income, substance-over-form) for setting aside separate entity 
status aside are not based in H-S even if the ultimate goal of 
ending deferral can be stated in H-S terms. 
The U.S. tax system allows taxpayers to obtain a foreign tax 
credit for income taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions.202 This is 
highly valuable, and the intended effect, generally speaking, is to 
place the taxpayer in the same position it would have been in 
vis-à-vis the U.S. income tax without the imposition of the 
foreign tax.203  If foreign taxes are viewed as merely another cost 
of doing business, then this credit mechanism is inconsistent 
with H-S and a deduction would be more appropriate.204  But H-S 
does not address the antecedent question of how foreign taxes 
should be viewed.  For example, a credit would be appropriate if 
foreign income taxes are viewed as equivalent to U.S. income tax 
payments.205  The Compaq case, discussed below, involved the 
problem of characterizing foreign taxes.206 
                                                          
 201. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 31, at 4. 
 202. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(1) (as amended in 2009) (allowing foreign tax credit 
if "[t]he predominant character of that tax is that of an income tax in the U.S. sense"). 
 The credit may not, however, exceed the U.S. tax, and, arguably, this should be 
tested for each transaction.  See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 117, at 543 ("Because the 
income tax system is based on transactions and the fundamental purpose of the foreign 
tax credit is to mitigate international double taxation, a theoretically pure foreign tax 
credit limitation would be applied on an item-by-item (i.e., transaction-by-transaction) 
basis.").  Because that is administratively difficult, a country-by-country approach would 
be the next best solution.  Id. at 543-45.  The current system departs significantly from 
such a norm.  Id. at 544-45. 
 203. See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 117, at 529-30; see also Stanley S. Surrey, 
Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 
818 (1956) [hereinafter Surrey, Current Issues] ("In effect, a dollar of foreign tax paid was 
treated as a dollar paid to the United States Treasury."). 
 204. Originally, foreign taxes were deductible only.  This changed in 1918, and a 
credit has been in place ever since.  Surrey, Current Issues, supra note 203, at 817-18. 
 By comparison, state and local taxes ("SALT") are generally viewed as being 
appropriately deducted under H-S when they are sufficiently connected to a business or 
investment.  See Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local 
Taxes under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 461 (1996) ("[I]t is generally 
taken for granted that business taxes should be deductible by the businesses that pay 
them.").  Considerable debate, however, surrounds the question of whether individuals 
should be able to deduct SALT.  See id. at 461.  But see Stark, supra note 114, at 1401, 
1404 (suggesting that Kaplow's interpretation of H-S is overly broad and arguing that a 
"more fundamental question . . . [is] why we should want to reform the tax system to 
make it more consistent with the Haig-Simons 'ideal' in the first place."); Brian Galle, 
Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the 'SALT' 
Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 851-52 (2008). 
 205. See Surrey, Current Issues, supra note 203, at 821-22 (describing a possible 
analysis of a foreign income tax as being "like the United States income tax," in which 
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IV. H-S ESD 
The H-S limitations described above are explored in the final 
section of this Part, which discusses specific "tax shelter" cases in 
terms of the proposed H-S ESD.  This review suggests, albeit on 
the basis of relatively few data points, that the H-S ESD may 
have explanatory power with respect to ESD case law, and H-S 
may also provide boundaries as to the proposed H-S ESD's 
application to suspect transactions.  Before turning to the case 
studies, this Part first provides an overview of the proposed H-S 
ESD and discusses the responsiveness of the proposed H-S ESD 
to the criticisms of the ESD. 
A. H-S ESD Overview 
This Article concludes that using H-S to reframe the ESD 
would result in a change to the ESD's function even though there 
would be some similarities to the current ESD.  As discussed in 
Part II.A, if a transaction passes the ESD, the taxpayer receives 
the claimed tax benefits;207 if the transaction fails the ESD, the 
transaction is treated as a substantive sham and all the 
taxpayer's claimed tax benefits are disallowed.208  In effect, the 
ESD allows taxpayers the benefit of their claimed positions so 
long as they played the tax game "fairly," as determined by 
application of the two ESD prongs. 
The proposed H-S ESD would change the ESD from yielding 
an all-or-nothing result to one that taxed the transaction 
according to H-S principles.209  Because H-S is about crafting 
ideal boundaries of the income tax base, applying H-S to reform 
the current ESD would require that the ESD become more 
                                                          
case "it is proper to consider it not as a cost but in the same manner as the United States 
income tax itself").  But see Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit 
Gets It Wrong In Compaq v. Commissioner, TAX NOTES INT'L, Apr. 15, 2002, at 195 
("[T]here is no principle of tax law or good sportsmanship that requires treating foreign 
taxes the same as domestic taxes."). 
 206. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.  The new ESD Code section specifies that "[t]he 
Secretary shall issue regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in 
determining pre-tax profit in appropriate cases."  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. 
2010). 
 207. Of course, some other approach (e.g., step transaction) may apply to 
re-characterize the transaction or deny claimed tax benefits.  See Keinan, Rethinking the 
Role, supra note 103, at 45-50. 
 208. See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 788. 
 209. Cf. McMahon, Economic Substance, supra note 37, at 1018 (noting that rules 
relied on in tax shelters "often deliberately deviate from an accurate computation of 
economic income"). 
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expressly about the income tax base and less about whether the 
taxpayer should get the benefit of particular, claimed tax rules.210 
The proposed H-S ESD would consist of two inquiries, 
labeled here as the business/investment nexus analysis and 
economic outcomes determination.211  These inquiries would be 
directly tied to the H-S requirements for tax base reduction: that 
an outlay be sufficiently connected to a legitimate business or 
investment purpose and that it actually reduces wealth.212  Thus, 
the nexus inquiry would test whether the transaction supported 
a business or investment goal apart from tax consequences.213  
The economic outcomes prong would assess and tax the actual 
change in economic position.214 
Although the nexus inquiry would review context and 
taxpayer intent just as is the case under the current ESD 
subjective prong, any analysis of pre-tax profit potential would be 
of more restricted significance.  This would result from the 
significant difference between the current ESD's objective prong 
and the proposed economic outcomes prong of the H-S ESD.  
Under the current ESD, if the objective inquiry is satisfied, the 
taxpayer receives the full benefit of her claimed tax benefits even 
if her actual economic change and her final tax consequences do 
not align.215  In contrast, the proposed H-S ESD requires that 
even if a sufficient business or investment nexus is 
demonstrated, the taxpayer receives tax consequences that are 
matched to actual economic change.216 
A general question that may arise is whether H-S could be 
used directly to police the tax base in the tax shelter area.  The 
difficulty with such a move is that H-S is a broad, theoretical 
principle; thus, its implementation almost always requires some 
other rule or standard to move H-S from theory to application.  In 
the tax shelter context, the presence of business entities further 
                                                          
 210. The ESD is, of course, also tangentially about the tax base since the result will 
affect the amount of taxes owed.  In addition, in order for a court to move to a more direct 
inquiry about tax base, it may first need to set aside the statutory or other authorities 
claimed by the taxpayer.  See supra Part III.B. (discussing need for legislative intent 
framework). 
 211. See McMahon, Beyond a GAAR, supra note 21, at 1723. 
 212. See Simons, supra note 3, at 54 ("[A]ccumulation or investment provides a basis 
for expense deductions in the future, while consumption does not."); see also I.R.C. §§ 162, 
212 (2006). 
 213. See McMahon, Beyond a GAAR, supra note 21, at 1724.  Professor McMahon 
has proposed amending § 165 to add expressly that corporate loss deductions must be 
supported by a profit-seeking purpose, and that "[m]erely being engaged in a trade or 
business should not suffice."  See id. at 1738. 
 214. See id. at 1723. 
 215. See McMahon, Beyond a GAAR, supra note 21, at 1727, 1729. 
 216. See id. at 1725-26. 
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complicates the use of H-S.  In addition, decisions will be 
required regarding transaction aspects as to which H-S is 
relatively silent or impractical.  As a result, the need for some 
mediating standard or rule seems likely.  The process of moving 
the H-S principle into a standard or rule is, of course, one that 
can prompt multiple approaches.  This Article takes the approach 
of retaining much of the form of ESD in order to provide some 
continuity but recognizes that H-S may lend itself to other 
solutions. 
B. Possible Benefits, Lingering Problems, and Potential 
New Concerns 
Using H-S to re-frame the function of the ESD could yield 
several benefits.  The doctrine as a whole would be anchored to a 
larger tax principle that has been influencing the development of 
the tax law for decades and about which there is considerable, if 
incomplete, consensus.217  H-S, for example, would provide a 
principled rationale for using business purpose to draw 
distinctions among transactions.  As discussed in Part III (and 
subject to the caveats discussed therein), H-S requires that 
purpose plays a critical role in calculating the income tax base—
that is, the role of  distinguishing non-deductible consumption 
from deductible business and investment expenses.218  In other 
words, a business or investment nexus requirement can be 
viewed as a foundational component of an income tax structure.  
As a result, an overarching, general business or investment 
purpose requirement is consistent with H-S.219  And, it follows, 
that the recent codification of this requirement is also consistent 
with H-S.220 
                                                          
 217. See discussion supra Part III; see also Gergen, supra note 87, at 131 ("The usual 
objection to the standards of tax motive and economic substance is that they lead to 
unprincipled decisions."). 
 218. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 219. But cf. Lederman, supra note 2, at 433 (arguing that neither tax motivation nor 
business connection should be relevant; instead "[t]he question should be whether 
Congress intended the claimed result"). 
 220. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2010); see also § 7701(o)(5)(B) (codifying 
ESD applicable to individuals only as "to transactions entered into in connection with a 
trade or business or an activity engaged in for the production of income"). 
 Such a result also would not be inconsistent with Gregory because the courts' 
approach in Gregory should not be interpreted as having anything to do with the general 
boundaries of an income tax.  See supra note 45.  Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gregory pre-dates Henry Simons' formulation of the income concept by approximately 3 
years.  See id.  Rather, the problematic language in Gregory can simply be viewed as a 
comment about the need to establish congressional intent with respect to a particular 
statute.  See id.  A H-S-centric reading of Gregory would be that the ultimate motive of 
the taxpayer does not matter so long as the transaction meets any applicable 
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While H-S ESD would anchor business purpose to a tax 
principle, it would not solve the problem of 
taxpayer-manufactured business purpose,221 nor would it resolve 
the question of how much business connection is enough.222  In 
addition, courts would need to develop nexus frameworks similar 
to those in place for determining the presence of sufficient "for 
profit" connection223  (and Congress could step in with rules just 
as what it has done elsewhere with respect to this standard).  In 
all likelihood, the presence or absence of the requisite purpose for 
a particular transaction would continue to be decided on the 
relative certainty of pre-tax profit or loss.224 
At the same time, however, a substantial benefit from the 
proposed H-S ESD would be a narrowing of the role of pre-tax 
profit.  The H-S ESD would relegate analysis of profit potential to 
the nexus analysis, and the ultimate tax consequences would 
hinge on the actual economic effect of the transaction.225  Thus, 
the H-S ESD would make clear that for a taxpayer to obtain a tax 
base reduction, the taxpayer would need to have both an 
appropriate purpose and an actual decline in wealth since the 
transaction would be taxed according to its underlying 
economics.226  Festooning a transaction with contingencies and 
potentialities might continue to influence the decision of whether 
the transaction had a non-tax business or investment purpose, 
but such trappings would only alter the tax consequences if and 
to the extent they actually altered the economics of the 
transaction as measured in terms of actual outcomes.227 
Of course, as is apparent in other areas of tax litigation, 
measuring actual outcomes remains a difficult task, and H-S 
                                                          
business/investment nexus requirement.  Cf. Lederman, supra note 2, at 404 (explaining 
that the Gregory opinions "do mean that having a tax-avoidance motive is not sufficient to 
render a transaction abusive").  Of course, determining business/investment nexus 
requires analysis of taxpayer purpose and intent, which can sometimes appear 
indistinguishable from motive.  See Blum, supra note 47, at 493 ("So long as the inquiry is 
directed at how much the transferor's conduct is to be explained by commercial and how 
much by noncommercial reasons, it matters little whether we refer to his motive or his 
intent or his purpose."). 
 221. Cf. supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 222. Cf. Blum, supra note 47, at 507-08 (describing how statutory tests resting on 
state of mind require analysis "of how much of the specified purpose is enough to satisfy 
the rule" and concluding that "[n]othing very instructive can be said" about such an 
issue). 
 223. See id. at 507 
 224. See id. 
 225. Cf. supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing the similarities 
between this proposal and that made by Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak). 
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comes with inherent limitations.  The proverbial elephant in the 
room is, of course, the continued problem of judicial 
determination of legislative intent.  This Article does not purport 
to resolve when a court should take the step of setting aside a 
taxpayer's claimed tax authorities because Congress did not 
intend or foresee the taxpayer's use of them and instead use of 
the proposed H-S ESD, were it enacted.228  The H-S ESD analysis 
does, however, highlight the need to develop such a framework, 
and the importance of H-S in shaping tax policy makes it a 
plausible principle to utilize in assessing a transaction once a 
taxpayer's claimed tax benefits have been set aside after a 
preliminary legislative intent determination. 
The H-S ESD also emphasizes the need for multiple 
approaches to the problem of tax shelters because the limitations 
of H-S make obvious that the H-S ESD is also limited as to which 
types of tax-avoidance transactions it can and should target.229  
The next section illustrates the H-S ESD in greater detail 
through consideration of five case studies. 
C. Case Illustrations 
This section uses the facts from five "tax shelter" cases to 
illustrate the H-S ESD.  Each section reviews the facts of the 
case and then discusses the H-S ESD result, including the 




The facts of Knetsch v. United States230 are well known to tax 
practitioners and scholars.231  Knetsch purchased ten deferred 
annuity bonds from the Sam Houston Life Insurance Company 
(Houston Life).232  Each annuity was "in the face amount of 
                                                          
 228. See supra notes 8 and 13.  Recent codification, of course, makes it unlikely that 
Congress will significantly revise the ESD in the near future.  See supra note 30. 
 229. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 230. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 362-64 (1960). 
 231. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax 
Avoidance, 40 TAXES 296 (1962); Calvin Johnson, Is an Interest Deduction Inevitable?, 6 
VA. TAX REV. 123, 132-35 (1986); Daniel N. Shaviro, The Story of Knetsch: Judicial 
Doctrines Combating Tax Avoidance, in TAX STORIES 313 (Paul Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009) 
("No case looms larger as a cornerstone of the doctrine defining impermissible tax 
avoidance than Knetsch v. United States."). 
 232. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362. 
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$400,000 and bearing interest at 2.5% compounded annually."233  
Knetsch paid $4,004,000 for each annuity bond using $4000 cash 
and $4,000,000 of debt;234 the $4000 over the face amount 
represented Sam Houston Life Insurance Company's fee.235  
Houston Life issued the debt, and it bore a 3.5% interest rate, 
payable in advance. 236  Thus, Knetsch purchased an asset 
generating a 2.5% return with debt requiring a 3.5% interest 
payment.237 
Knetsch regularly borrowed against any increases to the 
annuity cash value at the same, payable-in-advance 3.5% 
interest rate (although always leaving a $1000 equity cushion).238  
Knetsch was allowed to borrow projected cash value increases in 
advance of their actual accrual.239 
His borrowing against the annuities and his payment of the 
interest due on that borrowing always occurred on the same 
day—with the implication that Knetsch used the borrowed 
money to make the required advance payment of the interest on 
that borrowed money.240 
The bonds were scheduled to mature when Knetsch turned 
90 years old.241  At maturity, if Knetsch continued with his $1000 
equity cushion, the annuity would have been $43 per month.242  If 
Knetsch had fully paid off the debt secured by the cash value,243 
then at maturity the contract would have paid $90,171 per 
month until his death.244  Knetsch exited the transaction early,245 
                                                          
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id.; Shaviro, supra note 231, at 341. 
 236. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362-63. 
 237. Id. at 363 
 238. Id. at 366. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 363. 
 241. Id. at 364.  Knetsch was 60 years old at the time of the transaction.  Shaviro, 
supra note 231, at 360. 
 242. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 364; see Shaviro, supra note 231, at 346 n.5 ("Knetsch 
would be out of pocket about $1.2 million as a result of paying Sam Houston about 
$40,000 per year for thirty years.  At a rate of $43 per month, it would take him 27,907 
months . . . [2,325.6 years] to earn this money back (disregarding the time value of 
money)."). 
 243. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 364. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See id. ("Knetsch . . . terminated it on December 27, 1956.").  Only the first two 
years of the transaction, 1953 and 1954, were at issue in the Supreme Court case.  See id. 
at 363.  Apparently, Knetsch exited because the IRS had already issued him a notice of 
deficiency.  See Shaviro, supra note 231, at 364. 
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and received the $1000 difference between the cash value of the 
annuity and the loan he owed Houston Life.246 
Each year, Knetsch relied on tax law provisions to deduct his 
3.5% interest payments.247  The annual 2.5% increases to the 
cash value of the annuities were excluded from taxable income,248 
and borrowing against the annuities was not treated as a taxable 
withdrawal of the increases in value.249  By making interest 
payments with non-taxable borrowed money, deducting those 
same interest payments, and excluding the annuities' increase in 
value from taxable income, Knetsch hoped to lower his taxes far 
in excess of the pre-tax loss generated by the differential between 
his interest payments and the increased value of his annuities.250 
The Supreme Court held that Knetsch should be denied his 
tax benefits.251  Knetsch was not, however, the only taxpayer to 
use this transaction.252  The table below illustrates the court 
results for Knetsch and substantially related transactions.  The 
table includes only determinations made by courts not yet bound 
by precedent.  For example, the Fifth Circuit issued a 
                                                          
 246. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 364. 
 247. See id. at 362-63.  In 1953, Knetsch deducted the interest payments under 
Section 23(b) of the 1939 Code.  Id.  In 1954, he deducted the interest payments under 
Section 163(a) of the 1954 Code.  Id.  Both Section 23(b) and 163(a)(2) allowed deductions 
for interest payments on indebtedness, including personal debt.  See I.R.C. § 23(b) (1934); 
I.R.C. § 163(a)(2) (1952). 
 248. Cash value increases inside annuity and cash value life insurance continue to be 
excluded from income.  See Luke, Beating the "Wrap," supra note 173, at 131-32. 
 249. During this time period, loans taken out against annuity cash values were not 
taxable.  See id. at 142-43.  Today, loans taken against annuity cash value are treated as 
taxable withdrawals.  I.R.C. § 72(e)(4)(A) (2006).  Borrowing is generally viewed a 
non-taxable event under both the Code and H-S.  See Fellows, supra note 119, at 788 
("Haig-Simons and the Code treat borrowing as a nontaxable event because the receipt of 
borrowed funds is offset by the taxpayer's obligation to repay the loan, leaving the 
taxpayer's net worth unchanged.").  Borrowing can, however, be used to obtain the 
benefits (i.e., cash) from a realization event with respect to a particular asset without 
technically triggering realization.  See generally id.  Although ultimately any gain will be 
recognized when the asset is sold (assuming no basis step-up at death under I.R.C. 
§ 1014), the benefits of deferral may be substantial.  See id. at 730 ("[O]ne way to describe 
the value of tax deferral is as the equivalent of an interest-free loan from the 
government.").  In some instances, Congress has expressly treated borrowing (or its 
equivalent) as triggering realization.  See, eg., I.R.C. § 1259 (2006) (constructive sales for 
certain appreciated financial positions). 
 250. See Shaviro, supra note 231, at 346 (explaining that Knetsch "could hope to end 
up more than $70,000 per year ahead" even with an economic pre-tax loss of $40,000 
because his claimed $140,000 interest deductions generated $110,000 of tax savings as a 
result of the high tax rates of the time period).  Since the annuities were not scheduled to 
enter their payout phase for many years, Knetsch's tax benefits were significant even 
after taking into account the eventual taxation of the cash value at actual distribution.  
Johnson, supra note 233, at 133. 
 251. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362, 370. 
 252. See, e.g., Emmons v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 26 (1958), aff'd, 270 F.2d 294 (3rd Cir. 
1959). 
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taxpayer-friendly opinion,253 so the table does not include the 
taxpayer-friendly result reached by a lower court bound by the 
Fifth Circuit's opinion.254 
 
Court Winner Dissent 
   
Tax Court255 Government Yes(one judge/ first 
T.C. case)256 
S.D. California257 Government - 
S.D. Texas258 Taxpayer - 
D. Arizona259 Government - 
2d Circuit260 Government Yes261 
3d Circuit262 Government No 
5th Circuit263 Taxpayer Yes264 
9th Circuit265 Government No 
Supreme Court266 Government Yes (three 
dissenters)267 
 
As is apparent from the table, the courts overwhelmingly 
held in favor of the government, with only a Texas district court 
and the related appellate decision holding otherwise (perhaps not 
coincidentally, the taxpayer-friendly decision out of Texas 
involved the Sam Houston Life Insurance Company).268 
                                                          
 253. See United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 254. See Roderick v. United States, Civ. No. 1994, 1959 WL 11866 (W.D. Tex.  Aug. 5, 
1959), rev'd, 290 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 255. See Emmons, 31 T.C. 26; Weller v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 33 (1958); Diggs v. Comm'r, 
18 T.C.M. (CCH) 443 (1959); Williams v. Comm'r, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 205 (1959). 
 256. Judge Tietjens dissented in Emmons but did not file a separate opinion.  See 
Emmons, 31 T.C. at 32. 
 257. See Knetsch v. United States, Civ. No. 577-57 WM, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4564 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1958). 
 258. See Bond v. United States, Civ. No. 9152, 1957 WL 10788 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 
1957). 
 259. See Haggard v. United States, Civ. No. 2749-PHX, WL 11753 (D. Ariz. Feb. 17, 
1959). 
 260. See Diggs v. Comm'r, 281 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 261. See id. at 330-32 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 262. See Weller v. Comm'r, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959) (consolidated with Emmons v. 
Comm'r, 31 T.C. 26 (1958)). 
 263. See United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 264. See id. at 584-85 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
 265. See Knetsch v. United States, 272 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1959). 
 266. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). 
 267. See id. at 370-71 (Douglas, J., Whittaker, J., and Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 268. See State Bd. of Ins. v. Sam Houston Life Ins. Co., 344 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Austin 1961, no writ). 
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It should, however, be noted for those unfamiliar with 
Knetsch that the ESD was not invoked since it had not yet even 
been formulated.  Two considerations support using the case 
results to discuss the potential usefulness of the H-S ESD, even 
though the ESD was not actually utilized in these cases.  First, 
Knetsch is an important forerunner and influencer of the ESD.269  
Second, the more recent corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) 
shelters used a technique virtually identical to that in Knetsch, 
were decided under the ESD, and were almost uniformly decided 
in favor of the government.270 
b. H-S Analysis 
The Knetsch transaction was irrational but for the claimed 
tax provisions.  The facts of Knetsch itself leave little room for the 
argument that Knetsch started with a reasonable investment 
and simply had bad luck.  For example, there is no indication 
that Knetsch intended to pay down the loan principal in order to 
increase the likelihood of a substantial annuity (albeit one that 
started when he turned 90) or re-finance the debt at a rate lower 
than the return on the annuities.271  Thus, under the proposed 
H-S ESD, any tax base reduction for Knetsch's outlays would be 
denied under the first inquiry for lack of sufficient connection to 
                                                          
 269. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 406-09 (discussing Knetsch's relationship to the 
ESD). 
 270. See, eg., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Comm'r, 326 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2003).  In 
American Electric Power Company, the corporation purchased a life insurance group plan 
covering a huge swath of its employees.  See id. at 739.  The corporation then borrowed 
against the policies' cash value.  See id.  The expected benefits and cash value increases 
from the plans did not exceed the policy expenses, including the interest on the loans 
secured by the policies.  See id. at 739-40.  The transactions only made sense after-tax 
because they allowed the companies to take immediate deductions for the expenses 
without currently including cash value increases in income.  See id. at 740.  The court, 
however, held that the COLI scheme lacked economic substance.  Id. at 745.  Other courts 
have almost uniformly reached the same decision.  See, e.g., In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 
F.3d 96, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that "[t]he COLI policies lacked economic substance"); 
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he 
broad-based COLI program lacked sufficient economic substance to be respected for tax 
purposes . . . .").  The exception was a district court in Michigan, which surprisingly held 
for the taxpayer even though the transaction was virtually identical to one already held to 
lack economic substance by the Sixth Circuit — the appeals court to which the district 
court opinion would be appealed.  See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 2d 
844, 850-51 (E.D. Mich. 2003), rev'd, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006).  Not surprisingly, the 
district court's opinion was reversed, although one appellate judge dissented.  See Dow 
Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594, 596 (6th Cir. 2006) (Ryan, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the COLI plan was an economic sham). 
 271. See Shaviro, supra note 231, at 361 ("[S]uppose interest rates dropped so steeply 
that Knetsch could now borrow from a third party at 1.5%.  Now the pre-tax interest rate 
arbitrage would favor him . . . . There is no evidence, however, that he was aware of this 
possibility, and his lawyers did not subsequently advance it as a rationale for the 
transaction."). 
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a non-tax business or investment purpose.272  The same analysis 
would apply to the substantially similar transactions entered 
into by other taxpayers.273 
As discussed in the previous section, courts considering 
Knetsch-style transactions have routinely held for the 
government.274  Consideration of the H-S concept provides one 
explanation for these results and also serves as a normative 
baseline against which to assess the "rightness" of the court 
decisions.  As explained in Part III, H-S would allow a tax base 
reduction only if the claimed mechanism is sufficiently related to 
a non-tax business or investment goal.  The primary mechanism 
for the tax base reduction in the Knetsch-style transactions was 
the claimed interest deduction on the debt secured by the 
insurance contracts.275  Interest deductions, if sufficiently 
connected to business and investment, are consistent with and 
not departures from H-S.276  As a result, the court results are 
consistent with an application of the H-S concept.277  Of course, 
the courts were likely unaware that they were using H-S, but 
since the tax system is an income tax system, it is not surprising 
that the courts reached results consistent with the H-S concept. 
                                                          
 272. See SIMONS, supra note 3, at 54. 
 273. In the unlikely event that Knetsch could have demonstrated the requisite 
non-tax purpose, Knetsch's economic outcome would have been readily ascertainable.  
During the first year, Knetsch deducted $143,465 of interest, and the annuities accrued 
$100,000 of cash value increases.  Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 349, 362, 363 
(1960).  Thus, Knetsch experienced a $43,465 out-of-pocket decrease in wealth.  See 
Shaviro, supra note 231, at 346 (describing the roughly $40,000 annual differential).  
Each year produced a similar differential.  See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 365 (asking with 
reference to two years worth of the contracts, "What did Knetsch get for the out-of-pocket 
difference of $91,570?").  Had Knetsch successfully reached the second inquiry of the H-S 
ESD, he would have been allowed a deduction — albeit one that was approximately only 
30% of the deduction claimed.  This result does assume a legislative intent determination 
that Knetsch should be denied the cash value exclusion since that would be the effect of 
netting the cash value increases against the interest deductions. 
 274. See supra notes 255-78 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362. 
 276. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., The Deceptively Disparate Treatment of Business and 
Investment Interest Expense Under a Cash-Flow Consumption Tax and a 
Schanz-Haig-Simons Income Tax, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 544, 547 (1997) (discussing why 
business and investment interest is deductible under H-S). 
 277. See, eg., Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362.  This, of course, assumes a court 
determination that nothing in the statute claimed by the taxpayer required a contrary 
approach.  Although this Article generally does not address the issue of crafting an 
interpretive framework, H-S analysis suggests itself as a possible legislative intent 
presumption in the face of tax rule ambiguity.  See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying 
text; see also discussion supra Part IV.B.  In Knetsch-style transactions, for example, 
rather than resort to the H-S ESD, courts could have used the H-S concept to read a 
business/investment purpose into the interest deduction statute relied on by the 
taxpayers. 
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Consideration should also be given to the other mechanism 
contributing to the claimed tax benefits in Knetsch: the exclusion 
for insurance cash value increases.278  This exclusion is a 
departure from H-S.279  Requiring inclusion of these increases 
would have been another way to deny Knetsch a large portion of 
his claimed tax benefits.280  Yet, the courts generally analyzed 
the transaction as being about whether to allow or deny the 
claimed interest deductions.281  This may simply have stemmed 
from the litigating position of the IRS.  Denying the exclusion 
would, however, also have necessitated overturning a 
long-standing legislative departure from H-S.282  The cash value 
exclusion has long been available to taxpayers regardless of their 
reasons for acquiring a life insurance policy or annuity contract 
— assuming the policy or contract is bona fide.  As a result, a 
strategy focused on the cash benefit exclusion would likely have 
led a court to analyze whether the contract was bona fide using a 
general substance-over-form test rather than trying to use the 
ESD to trigger outright denial of such a well-established 
exclusion.  Indeed, the repeated use of the word "sham" in the 
Supreme Court's decision in Knetsch is suggestive of an inquiry 
into whether the annuity contract at issue was bona fide.283 
2. ACM Partnership 
ACM Partnership involved an allocation of gain to foreign 
partners.284  Unlike TIFD III-E Inc., also referred to as Castle 
Harbour,285 the primary strategy at issue in ACM took place at 
the partnership level.286 
                                                          
 278. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 367-369. 
 279. See generally SIMONS, supra note 3. 
 280. Since the cash value accumulated at a slower rate than the interest payments, 
the inclusion would not fully offset the interest deduction.  See supra notes 188-91 and 
accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text. 
 282. The circumstances under which a court would overturn such a Code provision 
would depend on the criteria a court used to determine legislative intent with respect to a 
taxpayer's use of a particular provision.  This Article does not purport to address the 
antecedent problem of interpretive framework, except to recommend H-S as a proxy in the 
event legislative intent is ambiguous.  See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text; 
supra discussion Part II.E. 
 283. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 365-67, 369 (using the word "sham" repeatedly). 
 284. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 235-36 (3d Cir. 1998).  For a 
discussion of ACM P'ship, see Bankman, supra note 37, at 8-10 and McCormack, supra 
note 14, at 756-58. 
 285. See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006).  Like ACM 
P'ship, Castle Harbour, also featured allocations to foreign partners.  See id. at 223.  
Castle Harbour will be discussed further below. 
 286. See ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 233. 
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a. Facts 
ACM Partnership had three partners: (1) 
Southampton-Hamilton Company (Southampton), a U.S.-based, 
wholly owned subsidiary of Colgate-Palmolive Company 
(Colgate);287 (2) Kannex Corporation N.V., a Netherlands Antilles 
entity controlled by a major Dutch bank;288 and (3) Merrill Lynch 
MLCS, Inc. (MLCS), a U.S. based wholly owned subsidiary of 
Merrill Lynch Capital Services, an affiliate of Merrill Lynch & 
Co., Inc. (Merrill Lynch).289  Each of the three partners was 
created by their parent entities shortly before creation of ACM.290 
Reduced to their essentials, the transactions undertaken by 
ACM were fairly straightforward.  ACM was initially capitalized 
with cash from the partners.291  Kannex, the Netherland Antilles 
entity, contributed the most for an 82.6% interest.292  
Southampton held a 17.1% share and MLCS a 0.3% share.293  
ACM used the cash to buy private placement notes from 
Citicorp.294  A little less than a month later, ACM sold $175 
million of the Citicorp notes for $140 million of cash plus notes 
whose interest rate was contingent on fluctuations to LIBOR 
(LIBOR notes).295  Payments on the LIBOR notes would be 
received over five years beginning in the year following the cash 
payment.296 
ACM used the installment method to report the "gains" from 
this transaction.297  Because a portion of the amount received was 
contingent, ACM relied on a Treasury regulation that allowed it 
to divide its $175 million basis in the Citicorp notes equally over 
the six years that payments would be received.298  Thus, 
approximately $29 million of basis would be allocated to each of 
the six years that payments would be received.299  In the first 
year, this generated a large capital gain of approximately $111 
million (equal to the $140 million of cash received minus the $29 
                                                          
 287. Id. 
 288. Id.  The Dutch bank was Algemene Bank Nederland N.V.  Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 239. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. See id. at 240. 
 296. Id. at 245-46 n.26. 
 297. Id. at 242. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
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million basis).300  In subsequent years, when the basis was 
applied to the payments on the LIBOR notes, ACM reported 
losses.301  Kannex remained a partner only long enough to soak 
up a large allocation of gains.302  When the losses began to be 
recognized, the U.S. partners took the allocations.303  
Economically, the exchange of the Citicorp notes for the $140 
million cash and LIBOR notes was a virtual wash, and after 
adding in the transaction costs, was unprofitable before tax.304 
The Tax Court and Third Circuit rejected the transaction as 
lacking economic substance.305  Colgate was not the only 
taxpayer to attempt a similar transaction as the transaction was 
actively marketed by Merrill Lynch.306  The D.C. Circuit rejected 
the same scheme as entered by other taxpayers.307  One district 
court upheld the transaction as having been entered for a 
business purpose.308  The table below combines the results in 
ACM and the similar cases.  In some of these cases, the court did 
not rely on the ESD and instead took a more general 
substance-over-form approach by looking at whether the parties 
had formed a bona fide partnership. 
 
Court Winner Rationale Dissent 






                                                          
 300. See id. 
 301. Id. at 245-46. 
 302. See id. at 241-42.  Kannex was allocated approximately $91.5 million, 
Southampton approximately $19 million, and MLCS approximately $325,000.  Id. at 242. 
 303. Id. at 243-44. 
 304. Id. at 257. 
 305. See id. 
 306. See Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Saba P'ship 
v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 1135, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2001), remanded to 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 817 
(2009). 
 307. See Boca Investerings P'ship, 314 F.3d at 632; ASA Investerings P'ship, 201 F.3d 
at 516; Saba P'ship, 273 F.3d at 1141. 
 308. See Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298, 380 (D.D.C. 
2001), rev'd, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 309. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997); Saba P'ship v. 
Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1999-359.  Saba Partnership was vacated by the D.C. Circuit and 
remanded in order for the Tax Court to apply its reasoning in ASA Investerings.  See Saba 
P'ship, 273 F.3d at 1141.  On remand, the Tax Court again held for the government but 
on the grounds that the partnership was invalid.  See Saba P'ship v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 817, 824 (2003). 
 310. See ASA Investerings v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998). 
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The decision in the D.C. District Court was reached after the 
D.C. Circuit had already invalidated the transaction as to other 
taxpayers.315  Not surprisingly, that district court decision was 
reversed.316 
b. H-S Analysis 
ACM's sale of the Citicorp notes clearly lacked a non-tax 
purpose since the sale was unprofitable after costs and was 
unrelated to Colgate's regular business.317  On the other hand, 
analyzing purpose in this context is somewhat problematic given 
the long-standing ability of taxpayers to control the timing of 
realization events.  On the gain side, business or investment 
purpose would be irrelevant since increases to wealth are 
included in the H-S tax base.318  Of course, losses on personal use 
                                                          
 311. See Boca Investerings P'ship, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 380. 
 312. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 263 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 313. See id. at 263-65 (Mckee, J., dissenting). 
 314. See ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Saba P'ship, 273 F.3d at 1141, remanded to 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 817 (2003); Boca 
Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 315. See ASA Investerings P'ship, 201 F.3d at 515; Boca Investerings P'ship, 314 F.3d 
at 627. 
 316. See Boca Investerings P'Ship, 314 F.3d at 627. 
 317. ACM used the payments received from the sale of the Citicorp notes to purchase 
fixed-rate Colgate debt.  ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 240-41.  Colgate expected declining 
interest rates, which would have made these notes more valuable to the payee and more 
expensive for Colgate.  Id. at 234-35.  Having the debt owned by a subsidiary would thus 
help Colgate to manage its overall debt and also mask the extent to which it was 
leveraged.  Id. at 235.  ACM alleged that the LIBOR notes were purchased to hedge the 
Colgate debt, which makes little sense given the stated reasons for ACM's purchase of the 
debt in the first place.  See id. at 255.  Yet this relationship between the Colgate debt and 
the LIBOR notes was given as one business motive for the transaction.  See id. at 255-56.  
ACM also argued that the Citicorp interim notes were good investments.  See id. at 254.  
Finally, ACM argued that the transaction had profit potential if interest rates were to 
rise.  See id. at 255-57.  This, of course, ran directly counter to their alleged reasons for 
buying the Colgate debt—that there was an expectation of declining interest rates.  See 
id. at 257-58.  Further, the transaction costs were large, so the transaction would have 
been profitable only if interest rates had risen sufficiently high so as to cover those costs.  
See id. at 257. 
 318. See SIMONS, supra note 3, at 50. 
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assets are disallowed, but if the asset sold is a financial asset, the 
presence of an investment purpose is generally assumed.319 
In the ACM-style transaction, the taxpayer depended on an 
artificial gain triggered by its allocation of basis followed by an 
artificial loss.320  There was an economic wash before taking into 
account the costs of entering into such a transaction.  It would be 
entirely proper to hold that the transaction lacked sufficient 
connection to business or investment purposes.  But 
consideration of the entrenched H-S departure of realization may 
help explain why some courts preferred to analyze the 
transaction in terms of whether the partnership itself was bona 
fide. 
Installment reporting is also an H-S departure and is 
intended to smooth the reporting of large gains.321  It has also 
been the subject of numerous legislative efforts to narrow its 
application.322  Thus, even if there were some reluctance to apply 
a purpose test as to a realization event involving a financial 
asset, using H-S ESD to deny the claimed gains and losses seems 
fairly easy since there was no net economic change (except in the 
unlikely event that sufficient investment nexus was found to 
allow some deduction for transaction costs).323  Since the 
partnership would have had nothing to report, the allocation 
agreement among the partners would have become irrelevant.324 
                                                          
 319. See I.R.C. § 165(c) (2006). 
 320. See ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 236-37, 260. 
 321. See McCormack, supra note 14, at 754, 758-59 (discussing relationship of 
installment reporting, including the contingent installment sale method, to the 
realization requirement). 
 322. See, eg., I.R.C. § 453(e) (limiting the installment method on second disposition of 
property by related parties); Id. § 453(g)  (limiting installment method availability for sale 
of depreciable property to controlled entity); Id. § 453(k) (requiring current income 
inclusion on sales of personal property under revolving credit plans or installment sales of 
publically traded securities). 
 323. See ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 238. 
 324. See id. at 252 n.42. 
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3. Compaq 
a. Facts325 
On September 16, 1992, Compaq entered into an agreement 
to purchase ten million of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) 
in the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Royal Dutch) for $888.5 
million (adjusted for costs). 326  Settlement was set for September 
17, 1992.327 
Also on September 16, Compaq agreed to sell 10 million ADR 
shares for $867.9 million (adjusted for costs) with settlement on 
September 21.328  The decrease in value was attributable to the 
shares changing from cum dividend to ex dividend status 
between Compaq's purchase and sale.329  Compaq reported a 
$20.7 million capital loss from the sale.330  Compaq had 
recognized a large long-term capital gain on an unrelated 
transaction that would soak up this loss.331 
Because Compaq was the shareholder of record on 
September 18, it was entitled to a $22.5 million dividend.332  
Compaq received cash proceeds of only $19.2 million after 
application of the Netherlands' 15% withholding tax.333  Compaq, 
however, received a $3.4 million foreign tax credit334 for the taxes 
                                                          
 325. Compaq is among the most written-about ESD cases; this Article provides an 
abbreviated account.  For a more complete account, see generally David P. Hariton, The 
Compaq Case, Notice 98-5, and Tax Shelters: The Theory Is All Wrong, 94 TAX NOTES 501 
(2002); Mitchell Kane, Compaq and IES: Putting the Tax Back into After-Tax Income, 94 
TAX NOTES 1215 (2002); William A. Klein & Kirk J. Stark, Compaq v. Commissioner — 
Where Is the Tax Arbitrage?, 94 TAX NOTES 1335 (2002); Knoll, supra note 59, at 838-58; 
Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 816-25; Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, 
Corporate Tax Shelters & The Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221 (2000); Shaviro & 
Weisbach, supra note 205. 
 326. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 218 (1999), rev'd, 277 F.3d 
778, 780 (5th Cir. 2001).  The $888.5 million price tag equaled the typical market price for 
the ADRs plus a $22.5 million dividend that had been declared minus a 15% tax owed to 
the Netherlands.  See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 818.  This price indicated that 
price-setting investors were not able to use the offsetting U.S. foreign tax credit.  See id. 
 327. Compaq, 113 T.C. at 218. 
 328. Id. 
 329. See id. at 215-16. 
 330. Id. at 219.  However, if the original purchase price of the ADRs is adjusted to 
reflect the implicit tax subsidy, this loss would instead be approximately $24.1 million.  
See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 819. 
 331. See Compaq, 113 T.C. at 215. 
 332. See id. at 219. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. "There was apparently no dispute that this was the correct amount of the tax 
credit under the formal rules on tax credits."  Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 822 
n.141 (citing Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (2001)). 
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paid to the Netherlands.  Thus, the transaction generated a 
significant tax benefit.335 
The lower court stripped Compaq of its claimed benefits, but 
its decision was overturned on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.336  At 
least one other taxpayer entered into a substantially similar 
transaction, as the table below illustrates. 
 
Court Winner 
Tax Court337 Government 
N.D. Iowa338 Government 
Fifth Circuit339 Taxpayer 
Eighth Circuit340 Taxpayer 
 
b. H-S Analysis 
Although most tax scholars agree with the results reached 
by the circuit courts as to the Compaq-style transaction, there is 
less agreement as to what rationale should have been used to 
deny Compaq its claimed tax benefits.  H-S analysis helps 
explain why this transaction is difficult to analyze.  First, as 
discussed above in the section on the ACM transaction, generally, 
when taxpayers buy and sell financial assets, such transactions 
are, in practice, presumed to have an investment purpose.341  
And, again, the realization requirement is arguably the most 
entrenched of all the Code's H-S departures.  Of course, in the 
Compaq-style transactions, there were strong indicators that the 
transaction was tax-motivated and that the sales took place in a 
rigged, not arms' length, market.342  This suggests that a strategy 
                                                          
 335. See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 822, n.143 (The total after-tax savings 
was approximately $1.1 million: "$7 million tax saving on capital loss + $22.5 million 
dividend + $3.4 million tax credit - $7.7 million U.S. tax on dividend - $3.4 million 
Netherlands tax on dividend - $20.7 million capital loss.").  Compaq was subject to a 34% 
tax rate.  Id. at 822. 
 336. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 214 (1999) (holding that 
"[t]he transaction lacked economic substance, and the foreign tax credit claimed by 
[Plaintiff] will be disallowed"), rev'd, 277 F.3d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that an 
"ADR transaction of the sort . . . [had] economic substance and a business purpose"). 
 337. See Compaq, 113 T.C. at 214. 
 338. See IES Indus. v. United States, No. C97-206, 1999 WL 973538 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 
22, 1999). 
 339. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 340. See IES Indus. v. United States, 253 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 341. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2. 
 342. For example, the precision with which all of the numbers aligned suggests the 
transactions were not arms' length.  See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 819-20 n.130 
(describing how the promoter adjusted its fees in order "to match precisely the net 
dividend and the pre-fee adjusted capital loss"). 
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targeted more at the lack of a bona fide purchase and sell may 
have been more appropriate — although, concededly, the circuit 
courts seemed to buy into the notion that the transactions 
occurred under market conditions.343 
The presence or absence of pre-tax profit was central to the 
circuit courts' decisions.344  It would also be a factor to consider 
under the proposed H-S ESD when determining whether the 
transaction had the requisite connection to business or 
investment purposes.  If one compares the gross dividend and the 
capital loss, there was pre-tax profit of approximately $1.9 
million.345  On the other hand, the result was a pre-tax economic 
loss of approximately $1.5 million if the capital loss were 
compared to the dividend net of the withholding tax.346  The 
lower court and appellate court disagreed as to which comparison 
was appropriate.347 
H-S analysis could be used to resolve the question, but it 
would require concluding that foreign taxes should be deductible 
and not treated similarly to U.S. income taxes.348  If it were first 
decided to treat foreign taxes as a cost outlay, the transaction 
clearly lacked a pre-tax profit.  That is, if instead of a tax credit, 
it were assumed that H-S would limit Compaq to a deduction for 
the foreign taxes paid, Compaq would have had a post-tax loss.349  
(ESD codification provisions specify that Treasury should enact 
                                                          
 343. See Compaq, 277 F.3d at 787. 
 344. See id. at 784-86. 
 345. See id. at 787. 
 346. See id. at 782. 
 347. See id. at 785-86. 
 348. See discussion supra Part III.B.3; see also Shaviro & Weisbach, supra note 205, 
at 195 ("[T]here is no principle of tax law or good sportsmanship that requires treating 
foreign taxes the same as domestic taxes . . . . While the foreign tax credit and other 
elements of the international tax regime sometimes try to mitigate the differences 
between the two, in no way are they the same thing.  The most they have in common is 
that they both happen to be taxes, but this is no reason that the pre-tax profit 
requirement has to treat them the same."). 
 349. The post-tax loss would have been approximately $1.1 million. See Luke, Risk 
Return, supra note 7, at 882 n.142. ("$7 million tax saving on capital loss + $22.5 million 
dividend" + $1.2 million tax saving on deduction of Netherlands tax "- $7.7 million U.S. 
tax on dividend - $3.4 million Netherlands tax on dividend - $20.7 million capital loss"). 
 Interestingly, Surrey raised the possibility that a foreign tax credit would not be 
appropriate in instances where the taxpayer could shift the foreign tax away from itself.  
Surrey, Current Issues, supra note 203, at 821 ("We can assume, however, that a foreign 
excise tax on sales or exports is passed on to the consumer . . . . Hence, we need not give a 
credit for foreign excise taxes since their payment does not affect our criteria of uniform 
tax burden.").  Compaq clearly did not bear the economic burden of the foreign tax as 
evidenced by the way the price of the ADRs was manipulated to reflect an implicit tax 
subsidy.  See Luke, Risk Return, supra note 7, at 818-19. 
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regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in 
calculating pre-tax profit "in appropriate cases.")350 
The inherent limitations of H-S analysis help explain the 
circuit court decisions.  The Compaq transaction played at the 
intersection of two areas that are problematic to resolve from an 
H-S viewpoint: timing and international transactions.351  
Formulations of the current ESD have seemingly developed so as 
to share in these limitations.  This suggests the need for the 
development of other approaches, but not the need to shelve the 
ESD altogether.  If the boundaries of the ESD can be 
conceptualized, then the ESD can be used when most likely to 
help and be set aside in favor of other tools when necessary. 
4. TIFD III-E Inc. (a/k/a Castle Harbour) 
a. Facts 
General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) was in the 
business of leasing commercial aircraft to airlines.352  Because of 
turmoil in the airline industry, in 1992, GECC sought to convert 
some of its future rental payments into current cash.353  Selling 
the airplanes on the secondary market was not viable,354 nor 
could GECC obtain non-recourse debt because of various 
contractual terms and a desire to keep its AAA credit rating.355  
GECC submitted requests for advice from seven investment 
banks.356  Ultimately, in March 1993, GECC found an acceptable 
proposal and put it into action.357 
On July 26, 1993, GECC caused three of its subsidiaries358 to 
create a new LLC.359  In exchange for their membership 
interests, the subsidiaries contributed (a) "beneficial ownership" 
in "63 'Stage II' aircraft worth . . . (a net value of $272 million); 
(b) $22 million of rents receivable on the aircraft; (c) $296 million 
                                                          
 350. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B) (2006 & supp. 2010). 
 351. See Compaq, 277 F.3d 778, 779-80. 
 352. TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96 (D. Conn. 2004), rev'd, 
459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 96-97. 
 355. Id. at 97. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94, 97 (D. Conn. 2004), rev'd, 
459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that TIFD III-M, TIFD III-E, and General Electric 
Capital AG are the three subsidiaries of GECC).  TIFD-III-E is the tax matters partner, 
and hence, authorized to bring suit.  Id. at 96. 
 359. Id. at 97. 
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in cash; and (d) all the stock of GECC subsidiary TIFD VI, which 
had a value of $0."360  On October 6, 1993, $50 million of the 
interests in the LLC was sold to two Dutch banks.361  
Subsequently, the Dutch banks "contributed an additional $67.5 
million, bringing their total investment to $117.5 million."362  At 
this point, the LLC was renamed Castle Harbour.363 
Castle Harbour was a partnership and the members entered 
into fairly elaborate allocation agreements and side 
agreements.364  Through such agreements, the Dutch banks, 
which were not subject to U.S. tax, were allocated virtually all of 
Castle Harbour's operating income for tax purposes.365  The 
projected actual return on the Dutch Banks' contributions that 
would be actually distributed to the Dutch banks was, however, 
carefully restricted to a range that hovered around 9%.366  The 
level of certainty about the projected distributed return was 
accomplished through the complex interaction of the partnership 
allocation agreements, the use of Castle Harbour's subsidiary to 
maintain just the right level of operating income inside of Castle 
Harbour, and a side guarantee agreement for the Dutch banks.367 
The district court upheld the transaction, and its decision 
included analysis of the ESD.368  However, the district court's 
decision was later reversed by the Second Circuit on the grounds 
that "the Dutch banks' interest was, for tax purposes, not a 
bonafide equity participation."369  Instead, the Second Circuit 
determined that "[t]he Dutch banks' interest was in the nature of 
a secured loan, with an insignificant equity kicker."370  The 
Second Circuit did, however, remand the case in order for the 
district court to consider the taxpayer's arguments under Code 
section 704(e).371 
                                                          
 360. Id. at 97 & n.4. 
 361. Id. at 97-98 ("[The sale] included all of GE Capital AG's interest, to . . . ING 
Bank N.V. and Rabo Merchant Bank N.V. . . . ."). 
 362. Id. at 98. 
 363. Id. 
 364. See TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98-100 (D. Conn. 
2004), rev'd, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 365. See id.; see also Karen C. Burke, Castle Harbour: Economic Substance and The 
Overall-Tax-Effect Test, 107 TAX NOTES 1163, 1167-68 (2005) (offering an insightful 
analysis of how the Castle Harbour allocations abused particular aspects of the 
partnership tax law). 
 366. See TIFD III-E, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 99. 
 367. See id. at 98-100. 
 368. Id. at 108-09, 121. 
 369. TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 241 (2d Cir. 2006); see also 
Keinan, Time to Voice, supra note 10, at 96-98 (discussing Castle Harbour). 
 370. TIFD III-E, 459 F.3d at 241. 
 371. Id. at 241 n.19. 
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This Code provision provides that a person "shall be 
recognized as a partner" if the person is the owner of a "capital 
interest in a partnership in which capital is a material 
income-producing factor."372  The provision was enacted to clarify 
that an individual who owns a capital interest will be treated as 
a partner even if his or her ownership was obtained through gift 
or intra-family sale.373  Whether an individual is an owner of a 
capital interest remains, however, a facts and circumstances 
determination. 
On remand, the district court determined that the Dutch 
banks were section 704(e) partners in spite of the Second 
Circuit's holding that the Dutch banks lacked equity 
participation interests.374  Full discussion of section 704(e) is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but the district court's 
interpretation of capital interest ownership gives far too much 
deference to taxpayer labels and is highly problematic given the 
history of section 704(e)'s enactment.375 
b. H-S Analysis 
The facts of Castle Harbour illustrate a significant limitation 
of H-S and thus point to the need for the use of a tool beyond the 
ESD (or H-S ESD).  Castle Harbour LLC was a joint enterprise 
conducting actual business operations that brought in income.376  
During 1994, for example, Castle Harbour received $100 million 
gross income and $9.8 million net income.377  Assuming the 
validity of these figures, this amount would clearly be taxable 
income under H-S.378  But that income must then be allocated 
among the partners, and H-S is essentially silent as to the 
division of income arising from a joint enterprise.379 
                                                          
 372. I.R.C. § 704(e) (2006). 
 373. See Lee A. Sheppard, Subchapter K's Attractive Nuisance, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
Jan. 11, 2010, available at 2010 TNT 6-5 (LEXIS) ("Older case law and legislative history 
show that section 704(e) is merely meant to allow recognition of a partner whose equity 
interest was conferred by gift or intrafamily purchase."). 
 374. TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 2d 367, 369, 395 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 375. See Sheppard, supra note 373 (using 704(e) history and general 
substance-over-form considerations to critique the district court's decision on remand).  
But see Monte A. Jackel & Robert J. Crnkovich, Castle Harbour Strikes Again, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Nov. 2 2009, available at 2009 TNT 209-14 (LEXIS) (cautioning that a Second 
Circuit reversal on appeal of the remand decision "would clearly create havoc in the 
financial markets, in which preferred stock in corporations has been treated as equity, not 
debt for federal tax purposes . . ."). 
 376. See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98 (D. Conn. 2004), 
rev'd, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 377. Id. 
 378. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 379. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text. 
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While it is possible to say that H-S requires the owner of an 
asset to report the income from the asset, "ownership" is a 
flexible concept and exceptionally difficult to ascertain in the case 
of a joint enterprise.380  The complexity of the partnership tax law 
framework is in large part attributable to the need to ensure that 
the partners' tax consequences follow their economic interests 
(which may generally be determined by agreement).381  Once the 
economic interests of Castle Harbour's partners were 
ascertained, its net income could have been apportioned.382  The 
appellate court, for example, determined that there was 
significant evidence that the Dutch banks had no equity 
ownership interests and, thus, were not partners to whom tax 
allocations could be made.383  Treating the Dutch banks as 




United Parcel Service (UPS) is a well-known shipping 
business.  UPS had a lucrative, and taxable, side business in 
charging fees (excess-value charges) for package damage 
protection.385  In 1983, UPS established a Bermuda subsidiary, 
Overseas Partners, Ltd.386  UPS then purchased insurance for its 
customers from a third party (National Union Fire Insurance 
Company).387  The premiums UPS paid to National Union were 
equal to the excess-value charges it received from UPS 
customers.388  UPS remained responsible for processing damage 
                                                          
 380. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text. 
 381. See I.R.C. § 704(a) (2006) ("A partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss, 
deduction, or credit [for tax purposes] shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, 
be determined by the partnership agreement."); see also SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 
31, at 191 ("Once the decision has been made . . . to treat [a partnership] as not 
constituting a taxpaying unit, a series of normative rules must be provided to relate the 
partnership accounts and activities to those of the partners in order to determine the 
treatment of the partners."). 
 382. See I.R.C. § 704(a)-(b). 
 383. See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 240–41 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 384. See id. at 223–24. 
 385. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1016 (11th Cir. 2001) 
("UPS turned a large profit on excess-value charges because it never came close to paying 
as much in claims as it collected in charges, in part because of efforts it made to safeguard 
and track excess-value shipments."). 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. 
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claims.389  National Union purchased re-insurance from the UPS 
Bermuda subsidiary and remitted to it the excess-value charges, 
"less commissions, fees, and excise taxes."390  Because the 
Bermuda subsidiary did not repatriate the premiums it received, 
UPS's tax liability substantially decreased.391 
The Tax Court held that the arrangement was invalid as a 
sham, but this decision was overturned on appeal.392  The 
Eleventh Circuit held that the UPS restructuring "simply altered 
the form of an existing, bona fide business."393  The appellate 
court did not address the possibility of an adjustment through 
other judicial doctrines, such as assignment of income.394 The 
court did, however, remand395 for consideration of section 482 of 
the Code, which prohibits the reallocation of income "in order to 
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly reflect the income" of two 
businesses.396  Transactions substantially similar to that at issue 
in UPS have not reached the courts. 
b. H-S Analysis 
There is little doubt that the UPS restructuring was 
motivated entirely by tax avoidance.397  Yet, the Bermuda 
subsidiary did apparently function as a bona fide, separate 
business entity from UPS (or, at least, this issue was not 
adequately raised in litigation).398  In addition, the restructuring 
was not the proximate trigger of the reduction to UPS's tax 
                                                          
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 1017.  It should be noted that almost all of the shares in the Bermuda 
subsidiary had been "distributed as a taxable dividend to UPS shareholders."  Id. at 1016. 
 392. See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, 1999 WL 
592696, at *39 (Aug. 9, 1999), rev'd,  254 F.3d 1014, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 393. Id. (Ryskamp, J., dissenting). 
 394. See id. at 1017–18 (The appellate court complained that it was "not perfectly 
clear on what judicial doctrine the [trial court's] holding rests. . . . The [tax] court did not, 
however, discuss at all the touchstone of an ineffective assignment of income, which 
would be UPS's control over the excess-value charges once UPS had turned them over as 
premiums to National Union."); see also Hariton, When and How, supra note 27, at 44-45. 
 395. United Parcel Serv., 254 F.3d at 1020. 
 396. See I.R.C. § 482 (2006).  The court also remanded for consideration of § 845(a) of 
the Code, United Parcel Serv., 254 F.3d at 1020,  a provision similar to section 482 but 
which is specifically applicable to the re-insurance context.  See I.R.C. § 845(a). 
 397. See United Parcel Serv., 254 F.3d at 1021 (Ryskamp, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 
evidence showed that tax avoidance was the initial and sole reason for the scheme in 
question, that UPS held off on the plan for some time to analyze tax legislation on the 
floor of the United States House of Representatives, and that a letter sent to AIG 
Insurance from UPS detailing the scheme claimed that AIG would serve in merely a 
'fronting' capacity and would bear little or no actual risk."). 
 398. See id. at 1019. 
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liability.399  Rather, the tax benefits arose out of the fact that 
ownership of UPS's future income stream had been moved to an 
offshore entity.400  While it is possible to argue that the tax 
motive for the restructuring should taint the future 
business-related activity, this would require a fairly expansive 
reading of the H-S "for profit" requirement.  Thus, the limitations 
inherent in H-S help make sense of the circuit court's decision. 
In terms of economic outcomes, the Bermuda subsidiary 
received actual income and complied with Bermuda law in terms 
of reporting any taxes (of course, Bermuda is a well-known tax 
haven).401  Although, as discussed in Part III, a plausible H-S 
approach would require ending deferral on foreign income, 
applying such a rule would not have been the best tool in 
evaluating the UPS case because it would require not only 
suspending Code sections, but would also require a decision as to 
the proper taxpayer identity.402  Arguably, a better approach 
would have been to assert other doctrines premised on the fact 
that the owners of UPS retained beneficial ownership of the 
future income streams.403 
V. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES AND CONCLUSION 
This project began as an inquiry into what H-S could bring, 
if anything, to the tax shelter problem.  The ESD seemed a 
natural place to begin since it has been at the forefront of the tax 
shelter debate.  This Article concludes that H-S could provide a 
principle for refining the ESD's content, for positioning the ESD 
within an interpretive framework, and for understanding ESD 
case law. 
The preceding section discussed five tax-avoidance 
transactions and how the application of H-S to their facts helps 
explain the court results.  In each of the case studies, the 
taxpayer relied in part on a rule that departed from H-S or 
exploited a limitation inherent in the H-S concept.  In cases when 
a court disallowed the taxpayer's transaction, such disallowance 
                                                          
 399. See id. at 1016-17. 
 400. See id. 
 401. See id. at 1016–17, 1019. 
 402. See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
 403. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 432-33 (discussing the use of § 482 of the Code 
or the assignment of income doctrine as alternative approaches to UPS).  Because the 
case settled before the trial court, on remand from the 11th circuit, issued a decision 
based on the application of sections 482 and 825(a), whether or not an alternative 
approach would have been successful will never be known.  See supra notes 395-96 and 
accompanying text. 
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yielded a result readily obtained through application of the 
business connection requirement of H-S.404 
On the other hand, courts were more reluctant to use the 
ESD to overturn a transaction when it appeared to have a 
business or investment connection and when it relied on 
long-standing H-S discontinuities (Compaq,405 Castle Harbour,406 
and UPS407). 
In these cases, the H-S ESD analysis suggested that other 
tools would have been more appropriate given the difficulty of 
resolving the H-S discontinuities inherent in the suspect 
transactions. 
The case studies as a whole suggest that there is a greater 
likelihood that a court will treat a transaction as a substantive 
sham under the ESD if reaching a result consistent with H-S is 
fairly easy.  If the limitations of H-S analysis are more extensive, 
then it becomes more likely that a court will allow the claimed 
tax benefits or use a method other than the ESD to disallow 
them. 408  If the ESD is a smell test, then how a transaction would 
fare under H-S may unconsciously influence the court's 
perception of a transaction's odor.409 
The possible link between H-S analysis and the common law 
ESD as illustrated by the case studies also supports the proposed 
use of H-S to re-frame the ESD.  The ESD has been controversial 
in part because it has been difficult to fit it into an interpretive 
framework and because its content remains problematic.  While 
the proposed H-S ESD does not address what criteria a court 
                                                          
 404. For example, the transaction in Knetsch would fail to meet the necessary 
business or investment connection.  See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.b.  Similarly, the 
transaction in ACM also lacked the necessary business or investment connection.  See 
discussion supra Part IV.C.2.b.  In addition, the taxpayer in ACM relied on a particular 
type of installment reporting.  See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 
1998).  This reporting is an H-S departure of relatively weak durability, given the 
numerous efforts over time to narrow it.  See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text. 
 405. The Compaq transaction relied on the realization requirement and on 
ambiguities surrounding the treatment of foreign taxes.  See Compaq Computer Corp. v. 
Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 779-80 (5th Cir. 2001).  Arguably, the transaction lacked an 
investment purpose, though this depends on one's view regarding the applicable market 
conditions but also on the treatment of foreign taxes for purposes of calculating profit. 
 406. The taxpayer in Castle Harbour used ambiguities surrounding the 
determination of tax ownership.  See TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 222 
(2d Cir. 2006). 
 407. H-S analysis of the transaction is limited, however, by its failure to address 
taxpayer identity.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 408. A more in-depth review of all ESD cases would, of course, be needed to explore 
fully the relationship of H-S and the current ESD. 
 409. Codification of ESD would not change this possibility, since the statutory 
language leaves unanswered the question of when the ESD should be relevant and also 
fails to define several key terms.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2006 & supp. 2010). 
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should use in making a preliminary determination about 
legislative intent with respect to a taxpayer's particular 
application of tax law, the proposed H-S ESD highlights the 
necessity for reaching such a determination.410  Using the 
proposed H-S ESD as a last step in legislative intent analysis has 
the virtue of utilizing a principle already widely incorporated 
throughout the Internal Revenue Code. 
Under the proposed H-S ESD, a court would look for 
business or investment connection as a necessary, but not 
sufficient, requirement for a transaction.411  The relevance of 
profit potential would be limited to an analysis of a transaction's 
business or investment connection since a court would still need 
to determine the economic reality of the transaction and assign 
tax consequences to it using H-S.412  Limitations inherent in the 
H-S concept would limit application of the proposed H-S ESD, 
but those limitations would also help clarify when this test 
should be used.  The H-S ESD is thus not proposed as the magic 
bullet for tax-avoidance techniques but as one weapon among 
many.413 
 
                                                          
 410. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 411. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 412. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 413. See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 37, at 1939. 
